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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

The Professional Teacher as Moral Agent

BY

Neil Kirkwood

(C)

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF MASTER OF EDUCATION

IN

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FALL 1988

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommended to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Reasearch for acceptance, a thesis entitled The Professional Teacher as Moral Agent submitted by Neil Kirkwood in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF EDUCATION in Philosophy of Education.

Supervisor

Date: September 16, 1988

Dedication

To Liz

because I love her.

Abstract

The forms of "professionalism" are investigated in general and specifically, for teachers, in order to discover how these structures and the power relations which support them affect moral considerations and moral agency for teachers. To this end a structural analysis of professions is adumbrated following Terence J. Johnson and M.S. Larson. From this study a context is developed for the consideration of both the occupation of teaching and the activity of teaching. This context focuses on the relations of power which mediate teaching in a modern monopoly capitalist society.

Philosophical considerations of teaching as an occupation and as an activity which do not consider the structural context of power relations as exemplified by the mediated professional form of teaching are critiqued. The implications of the conclusions which such considerations produce are shown to have difficulties in their realization in an equitable way because of the non-dialectic and ahistorical nature of their premisses.

Alienation as a social and psychological phenomenon and as a locus for the development of non-moral behavior is studied from the perspective of Christopher Lasch's notion of the "Culture of Narcissism" and from the perspective of current feminist thought, through the works of Carol Gilligan, Mary O'Brien, and Jane Martin. These approaches take into account the effect of power relations in contemporary society and the implications of these for the development of moral consciousness and morally able individuals in the face of alienating social forms.

The implications of these analyses are explored in some detail. Critical notions of the relationship between the areas of social and moral philosophy are used to formulate normative expressions of what the moral task and social role of professional teachers ought to be.

The moral imperative for teachers becomes the reduction and amelioration of alienation in their students, to enable these students to develop their conscious ability to think and act morally. It also implicates teachers -- as a profession and as individuals -- in

the production of social conditions to promote this integration -- in other words, to promote a morally consonant society.

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is an attempt to explore the normative meaning of the phrase, "professional teacher." What does each term in the phrase mean in relation to the other? And what should the phrase come to mean in the larger contexts of education and society? Though teachers, usually through their various representative organizations, have been making claims to professional status throughout the twentieth century, little has been written in the philosophy of education about the implications such status would have or ought to have for teachers, their students, the practice of education, and society in general.

Perhaps one reason for this seeming lack of consideration of this aspect of the practice of teaching is that the definition of "profession" and the terms derived from it (professionalism, professionalize, etc.) have been treated as unproblematic and are taken for granted, especially given the paradigm presented by such occupations as medicine, law, and engineering. Within such a view the basic problem for teachers reaching professional status has been seen as "measuring-up" to the standards which such paradigm professions seem to have set in their practice -- especially with regard to autonomy and monopoly of practice and establishing an esoteric and conventionally verifiable knowledge base.

Thus, the basic problem in philosophy for teachers would seem to be how to set and achieve such standards and such a knowledge base. Indeed, there has been much written in the philosophy of education which supports such a project, if not explicitly, then implicitly by insisting, rightly or wrongly, on the sui generis nature of education and providing a narrow definition of what is educational, as opposed to simply instructive or developmental.

Some of the problems with such an approach are revealed when a careful and critical study of the institutions of professionalism is undertaken and the "nature" of these institutions is viewed not as unproblematic but with an eye toward how they have affected and do affect our social, political, economic, and -- potentially -- our ethical and educational concerns. In the first chapter of this thesis this is what I attempt to do. Using a structural

analysis drawn from the sociological study of professions I briefly examine the history of professionalism especially as it applies to teaching and what have come to be seen as the institutions of education. Some of the implications of the structure of teaching as an occupation for the practice of education are noted. Of particular consequence in this regard is the notion of individual education, or at least schooling, as part of a socializing process and as a social "good." That is, it is seen to be of benefit to society as a whole to provide education/schooling to as many individuals as possible. The "right" of individuals to this service is, to say the least, somewhat ambiguous. It often seems more of a "duty" imposed by law upon children and their parents. There are many complex reasons for this but one of them is the legitimating factor compulsory schooling provides for the structural inequalities of condition which a system of professional privilege maintains.

The development of professions and notions of professionalism in conjunction with the institutionalization of the process of "education" in modern forms has implications for the philosophic discussion of teaching as an activity and as a profession. Chapter two presents critiques of such discussions of teaching, as an activity and as a profession, which ignore or minimize the sociological implications of teaching as a professionalized occupation. The moral implications of structural arrangements made in seeking professional status are not ameliorated by "codes of ethics" or "standards of professional conduct" which often serve, intentionally or otherwise, to maintain occupational homogeneity, monopoly of practice, and professional privilege, rather than any specialized moral standards or considerations. By treating the professionalized organization of teaching as a more-or-less neutral vehicle for the conveyance of schooling or education these philosophers ignore some of the features of such an organization and the social forms which accompany and condition it. These impose certain actual modifications and consequences upon the practice of teachers which may invalidate, subvert, or negate these idealized -- if myopic -- views of schooling, education, and teaching.

Chapter three begins working toward a more adequate view of the task of professional teachers as moral agents. It is recognized that such a view must take into account the sorts of social forms and forces which go toward providing an environment for human activity -- including those derived from the historical movement of monopoly capital. As is explained in chapter one, the development of professionalized forms of occupational control is one of those forms, but not the only one, others are considered in subsequent chapters.

In the third chapter the work of Christopher Lasch, a noted historian and social critic, is examined because one of his main concerns is the development of the historical relationship between social forms and the genesis of non-moral behavior in individuals and populations in modern society. Lasch identifies and articulates the problem of immoral, amoral, and unethical behavior as it exists in a society in which material well-being is apparently readily available and relatively wide-spread. This obviously has implications for the systems of schooling and teaching as one of the marks of modern society is the nearly universal access to educational opportunity. Lasch's analysis examines the meaning and failure of this "opportunity" for engendering moral behavior.

Also studied for their insights into the relationship between social forms and non-moral behavior are certain feminist scholars: psychologist, Carol Gilligan; sociologist, Mary O'Brien; and philosopher of education, Jane Roland Martin. On the surface the basis of their critique of society and the effect of its structural arrangements is quite simple: society is a sexist organization which has a systemic bias against women in the distribution of power and the consequent and subsequent phenomena which attend such a distribution. Thus it is not surprising that non-moral behavior should exist in what is basically a non-moral social structure. The analysis of specific factors in society and how they affect the people who constitute it offered by these three women is, however, complex and subtle and shares at least two perceptions with Lasch.

The first perception is that the relationship between individuals and their social environment may be conceived as one of mutual causation or reciprocal effect -- in other words, as a dialectical relationship. It is important to note that none of the above see this dialectic as a mechanistic-deterministic one; where social forms completely condition human thought and experience, while being, themselves, largely impervious to the conscious machinations of human individuals or groups. Lasch explicitly demonstrates his opposition to such a behaviorist position, which has such a morally futile view of human capability.[1]

Another important implication of this perception of social/human relationships is that it realizes the importance of history as an ongoing process which may be seen as the record of human interaction with various types of human environment. What this implies is that attempts to distill something "essentially" human from one isolated, perhaps highly controlled moment, may be doomed to failure unless they are viewed in the context of the process of history. Changing circumstances may change the given response to a particular condition.

The other perception Lasch and the feminist theorists examined here share is a notion of how a concept of alienation is tied to evidence of non-moral behavior. The approach to alienation, its genesis, and effects is slightly different in each case. Lasch, in general, concentrates on the psychological aspects and consequences for individuals and the population at large. While Gilligan, O'Brien, and Martin concentrate on the broader issues concerning primarily a certain class of people - women. These different emphases, however, result in highly complementary conclusions about the relationship of social forms and the development of humans as moral agents. Particularly of moment in this regard are the insights derived from Lasch and Gilligan about the process of the development of the ability to appreciate value and meaning and the parallel development of a sense of self.

The fourth and final chapter attempts to draw-out the consequences of this view of the relationship of alienation to moral behavior in more specific terms for professional

teachers. The teacher's task as a moral agent is cast not in the conventional terms of individual rights and obligations, but in terms of the creation of social forms which allow the development of facilities for moral consciousness. The notion of being "proactive" is here implicitly contrasted with being "reactive." That is, teachers as a group concerned with their students and the possibilities for their students' future, must not only react with efforts to ameliorate the undesirable alienating effects of social forms upon their students; they must also act to produce and maintain social forms, including their own organizations, which will enhance their students' chances of living in a morally consonant society.

Initially this may seem a long way from what are seen to be the normal considerations for moral agency. And my insistence on considering teaching as a professionally organized activity may also seem arbitrary. But a critical appreciation of teaching and learning as socially constituted activities rather than simply as some intellectual processes which take place in isolation has the consequence that much of their necessarily moral aspect must itself be socially (politically, and economically) constituted. These aspects must also be addressed in formulating an adequate view of what it ought to mean to be a professional teacher. This I have tried to do in what follows. If this view is at odds with the conventional considerations of the moral task of teachers it perhaps highlights the need for change -- both in the actual situation of teachers and their students, and in our commonly accepted ideas about teaching as a moral activity.

Introduction: Footnote

1. Christopher Lasch, The Minimal Self (New York, 1984), pp. 214-216.

CHAPTER ONE

THE CONCEPT OF "PROFESSION" AND ITS APPLICATION TO TEACHING.

My thesis is entitled, "The Professional Teacher as Moral Agent," and to begin my study of the relationship between these two roles, if indeed they are two roles, I would like to start in this chapter by examining and establishing what is meant by "profession" and related terms such as, "professional" and "professionalism." Then I will demonstrate how the meanings of these terms might apply to the occupation and practice of teaching.

Profession, and its various related forms, are words which seem, upon reflection, to have a number of different usages, meanings, and connotations. For example, a profession may be any relatively high-status job. A professional may refer to someone who gets paid for doing something others might do for recreation or out of necessity. Thus we have professional hockey players, professional gunfighters, and "the world's oldest profession." It may also refer to an expected or achieved level of competence in performing a job or service -- so someone may do a very professional job in building her own patio. Or we may conflate some or all of these notions of profession. We expect professional hockey players to demonstrate a higher level of competence and dedication than those who simply pursue it for recreational purposes. Many professional entertainers, besides displaying more competence, may also be highly remunerated for their services, thus gaining a certain high level of status and prestige.

But there are other more precise meanings for these terms associated with the literature of sociology, which may be of more critical use in investigating the moral and ethical dimensions of any given "profession." It is, at times, important to make these distinctions in meaning because the term "profession" and its associated forms are often used in confusing ways to legitimize or delegitimize occupational activities by various

groups. While the claims of an occupational group to a monopoly on the use of esoteric, but necessary or important, "professional" knowledge, such as in medicine, justifies high levels of remuneration; the "professional" ethic of "service" is used to vitiate attempts by other occupational groups, such as nurses or teachers, to achieve greater remuneration or autonomy by withholding the product of their professional labour from their employers and from their clients.

A Sociological Approach

From the perspective of sociological considerations perhaps the most useful concept of professions, professionals, and professionalism is based on the notion of occupational control which is developed by Terence J. Johnson in Professions and Power.[1] The elegance of Johnson's concept derives from its simplicity in being able to classify and include most occupations which have a serious claim to professionalism. Johnson, himself, points out problems with "trait" approaches to a definition. Essentially these are attempts to distill a singular list of professional characteristics from those attributed to occupations considered, by some unspecified or tautological method, to be professions.[2] As well Johnson deals with the "functionalist" approach, which is perhaps more "parsimonious" in its theoretical conception, but suffers from being ahistorical in its understanding of the genesis of professions and uncritical of the role differences in power and interests have made in the continuing development of "professional" structures.[3]

Essentially what Johnson has done is to briefly identify, not the traits which classify certain occupation as professions, but rather the forms of "occupational control" which have developed historically since the Industrial Revolution to meet certain social, political, or economic needs: what Johnson describes as a "structure of uncertainty." This "structure" was initially generated by the historically extreme divisions of labour which industrialization initiated and the coincident and subsequent forms of capitalism it encouraged.[4] It is important that rather than being seen as occupations characterized by

certain traits which are inherent in their nature, professions are historically specific forms of controlling an occupation which would act in an area of "social tension." As Harry Braverman indicates in Labor and Monopoly Capital, the management of these "structures of uncertainty," the filling of these "needs," is historically a circular activity of ever increasing circumference. This process was initiated by the division of labour resulting from industrial forms of production, which eroded wide-ranging personal or community competencies and replaced them with specialized, individualized, professional expertise.[5]

In his study of the forms of professionalism Johnson identifies three main types characterized primarily by the power relations which have developed historically between the producers of the professional service and those who consume that service or are the clients of that service.

The first type of professional control is that typically thought to be exemplified by doctors and lawyers where the producer of the professional service is primarily in charge of both defining the needs of the consumer and determining how those needs will be met. Typically, professional associations exercise a great deal of autonomy and are fairly influential, not only in their own defined area of expertise, but in the broader social sphere as well. Standards and discipline are internally defined and administered. Usually there is a great deal of interpenetration between practitioners and academic research and training in the universities. Professional producers, in this form, through their association and by their socialization during training, present a homogeneous front to their clients -- especially with regard to an apparent or actual standard of service -- while clients tend to be heterogeneous individuals. Johnson identifies this type of occupational control as collegial and also refers to it as Professionalism.[6]

A second type of control which began developing roughly simultaneously with the collegial form during the nineteenth century is the patronage model. Occupations such as engineering, accounting, and, more recently, advertising exemplify the characteristics of patronage forms of control. As Larson indicates in The Rise of Professionalism, where

she compares the development of medicine and engineering during the nineteenth century in an Anglo-American setting,[7] though they share a certain legitimation of practice in a rational/scientific cognitive base, the nature of the services provided creates significant differences in the form of occupational control. Whereas lawyers and doctors, as indicated above, are usually thought to provide services to individuals these other occupations typically offered their services, not to individuals per se but to capital. Since the primary concern of occupations such as engineering and accounting is the manipulation or regulation of capital, practitioners of these occupations tend, in a society which gives much precedence to large formations of capital, to be in an opposite position with regard to the professional-client relationship to their collegial counterparts. Since concentrations of appropriate capital are usually held by comparatively few clients it is this group which tends to display a greater homogeneity rather than the professional occupational group which provides them with a service. These practitioners in turn find themselves in a position of patronage[8] where the client defines her, his or its own needs and the framework within which these will be met.

In such a situation the autonomy of the occupational group is adversely affected by the relative lack of cohesion. Members tend to see their interests as being more clearly identified with those of their client or employer rather than their professional occupational group.

The third form of occupational control delineated by Johnson is that within which a third party, often the state or one of its agencies, mediates between the producer of the service and the consumer of the service. In this case relations are structured so that the mediating party has a large degree of power, authority, or influence in deciding what the consumer's needs are and how they are to be met by the producer of the professional service. As might be expected the historical development of this form of occupational control is more recent than the former two. Larson indicates occupations such as social

work, nursing, and teaching did not begin to adopt their present form until the shift to corporate or monopoly forms of capital was taking place, well into the twentieth century.[9]

In this form of control the "professional's" autonomy is severely constrained in contrast to the other forms of occupational control, however there is generally a guaranteed market for the professional service.

The services rendered by professionals operating under this form of occupational control appear to be more ill-defined or diffuse when they are compared with those rendered under the collegial or patronage forms. In these forms services are rendered more-or-less unambiguously to individuals in the first case and to capital or for the holders of capital in the latter case. As Johnson notes:

> It is clear ... that under state mediation there is a diffusion of the consumer role itself. At times it becomes less apparent who the consumer is, and the clear-cut ethical prescriptions of professionalism which specify "client" and colleague relationships are no longer entirely applicable.[10]

Indeed the term client may be misleading in the case of many mediated forms of professional control as there is no direct fiduciary relationship between the person providing the service and the person, or group of people who are being serviced -- indeed such a fiduciary relationship may be considered unethical. The benefits of this form of professional service may not be directly beneficial or readily apparent to those who may be seen as the objects of practice. The practice of these occupations may be seen primarily as more of a social good or end rather than as something of value to the individual or to capital in a direct way. Obviously this is not an uncontentious point of view but the fact that there is a third party, very often the state, facilitating or mediating, indicates that this party has an interest in seeing that the service is provided. The nature of this interest often determines the form and extent of the service. As Larson indicates many of these occupations owe their existence and/or (mediated) professional form of occupational control either directly or indirectly to the growth of "heteronomous bureaucracies, and primarily ... the expansion of

the bureaucratic apparatus of the state"[11] during the early part of the twentieth century when capital forms transformed from the entrepreneurial to the "corporate" or "monopoly" phase.[12]

Briefly, what this meant was that there was a growth of "private" corporate bureaucratic structures while science and technology were incorporated within expanding corporate formations. Professionals such as researchers, engineers, scientists, and a wide variety of administrators/managers had their occupations absorbed or created in this process of bureaucratic expansion. Coincident with this growth was the growth of infrastructures in the public sphere which were to aid the growth of private monopoly capital and mitigate the effects of this growth and concentration of capital. This aiding and mitigating was also done through bureaucracies of ever-increasing size and complexity. Thus systems of education and public welfare as well as regulatory and research agencies were developed and expanded. Aside from their usefulness for maintaining and expanding the structures for capital formation and accumulation directly, some elements of this infrastructure also serve to ideologically legitimate the processes of monopoly capitalism as a whole.

This legitimation is multidimensional in form, functioning usually in several different ways, on several different levels simultaneously. The nature of how a specific professional occupational structure might operate in this way may vary from occupation to occupation, and I will examine, how it operates for teachers in more detail below. In general, however, this process of legitimation can be seen in the growth of what Larson identifies as the "collective mobility project";[13] increasing numbers of occupational groups seek what they see as "professional" status within their own particular bureaucratic structure or structures as well as society-at-large. The fact that professionals -- or at least the members of some professions -- have high status, wealth, and perhaps power in our nominally egalitarian society is legitimated in a meritocratic manner. Since members of a profession must study and train long and hard to master their area of esoteric knowledge, they must be highly regarded and compensated. And even though there may be limited

access to training in the occupation, it would -- in theory -- be open to anyone who might qualify. So within the notion of profession itself exists the notion of inequality. It is important to note here that the notion of equal but meritocratically limited access to these professions depends upon the existence of a system of free public schooling.

In sociology the question of professional autonomy is usually phrased in terms of "proletarianization"[14] and is seen as a result of the increase in the proportion of capital as a factor in the production of professional services of all kinds, be they collegial, patronage, or mediated. Developments such as medicare, legal aid, the centralization of technological medical services in hospitals and the growth of large legal firms, place doctors and lawyers in day to day contact with bureaucracies which may erode some of their autonomy as practitioners and move the professions in the direction of a mediated form of occupatio control. Obviously these professions, because of their historical development maintain a greater degree of autonomy because many aspects of the collegial form of control were established prior to the development of any corporate or state bureaucratic imperative. For example, each of these professions has a large degree of control over the selection, education, and socialization of occupational trainees. Professional certification is done by the professional association. And the pattern of fee for service, rather than a salary is generally maintained.

The danger for monopoly capital, from an ideological point of view, of too thorough a compromise of professional power and autonomy through incorporation within externally generated bureaucratic structures, for collegial forms, is that it would serve to vitiate the notion of meritocratic legitimations of social, economic, and political inequality. Like other careers the occupational path to "upward mobility" would be seen to end in employment in a large bureaucratic structure instead of an autonomous and self-directed career.

In more fully mediated professions such as teaching, where the structure of occupational control was initially established within, or as a part of, a larger group of

educational bureaucracies -- issues of authority, autonomy, and accountability are not always as clearly perceived as they have been in the older professions. It is important to note that the differing manifestations of mediation experienced by the professional teacher and the professional doctor are produced as a result of their differing historical development and not necessarily produced by any logical imperatives in the differences in their cognitive bases or because of the kind of services they offer.

The Mediated Structure of Teaching

The structure of the mediation experienced by professional teachers in the contemporary world[15] has some important consequences for the nature of the relationships they enter into in their occupational lives. The form of occupational control of teaching naturally has much to do with the specific developments in the history of "educational" institutions. The idea of mass, public, "free," and compulsory education is a child of the Industrial Revolution. As Christopher Lasch, among others,[16] indicates, schooling from this period was developed and financed explicitly as a method of economic and political socialization. The compulsory nature of schooling, makes it not a "right" of children, but a duty incumbent upon them as potential citizens. The free/public nature of this schooling is a legitimating factor, as noted previously, in maintaining a degree of social and material inequality. It is seen as a method of ensuring, to some extent, the "equality of opportunity" needed in a meritocratic legitimation of such actual inequality of condition. And thus, as noted above, the maintenance of such a system becomes necessary for maintaining the ideology of professionalism as well as monopoly capital itself.

Since schooling was seen, primarily, as a "public" good, it developed, and continues to develop, as a mass bureaucracy. This is in contrast to medical practice, which until recently, was thought of primarily as a good rendered on an individual basis and its institutional arrangements, or lack thereof, reflected this. Thus teachers practice in a classroom with more than one student, usually, and the course of study is externally

prescribed and lengthy, almost always -- in the modern setting -- involving many teachers, each with her own specialty, in the normal programme of schooling. Doctors usually minister to one patient at a time and do so only as the needs of the patient -- as identified primarily according to the standards generated within the medical profession itself -- indicate.

The introduction of "professionalized" experts into a growing bureaucracy allows that structure to expand and diversify its area of control. The use of professional discretion and expertise allows for the control of areas of uncertainty and irregularity within a bureaucratic framework. Such areas include services to humans or in areas where there has developed no high degree of technological predictability.[17] This helps to explain how as the imperatives of monopoly capital and its coincident adoption of technology have expanded so has the social imperative for schooling and thus the physical, economic, and political structures of education.

As the course of studies for the average student became more lengthy and as the number of students increased, particularly after World War II, the mostly latent structures of occupational control became reified for teachers. The growing sophistication of the cognitive base and a competition of educational theories and practices had combined with the trend at mid-century to provide teachers with a level of discretionary control of their own occupation and within the school. But the actual power wielded by the teacher, the amount of autonomy exercised and the accountability of teachers are all, perhaps paradoxically, circumscribed by the way in which formal institutions administer education and mediate occupational control.

In Alberta, for example, the provincial government, through the department of education, directly controls curriculum content and the certification of schools and teachers. It indirectly controls schools at the local level through its budgetary support of local administrations from the general provincial tax revenues. The provincial universities are responsible for educational research and teacher training. The Alberta Teachers'

Association controls professional standards, collegial relations, and may discipline members in either area as well as act as a bargaining agent for its members with the local school board over issues of employment. It may also lobby various levels of government in areas affecting teaching, education, and schooling. The administration of the schools as physical entities and the direct employment of teachers per se is done by local administrations which may be formally separated from other forms of local municipal government. These local school districts are governed by school boards which are generally elected from the population at large.[18] Revenue for these districts comes from locally levied property taxes and from grants and disbursements, as mentioned above, from the provincial government.

It becomes obvious that the classroom teacher must respond to, and account for, many influences in the course of her occupational activities. Teachers must qualify at a university for the provincially issued teaching certificate. Unlike the law or medicine, where the proto-professional"s first heavy dose of formal occupational socialization comes through the monopolization of the course of studies by people in the professional faculty who are themselves practising or closely aligned with the given practice; in teacher education this is generally not true. Instructors in the faculties of Education may not be or ever have been professional teachers and thus may not be members of the professional association. Further with few exceptions, teachers are supposed to be expert generalists in their subject area, all must take courses outside the professional faculty. These factors, along with the lack of quotas which could foster a sense of elite solidarity, tend to diffuse the socializing impact of professional training for teachers.

Though the provincial government has the authority to grant and rescind professional certificates, it does so in circumstances which mediate its power. In granting certification it accepts the recommendation of the universities as teacher training institutions. In rescinding it may act on the recommendation of many groups such as the

employing school district, the public, or the A.T.A. In any such case it is usually bound to follow the direction of a quasi-judicial Board of Reference.

The most common direct manifestation of the provincial government's authority for the classroom teacher is the control it has over the curriculum, which prescribes what to teach and -- to a great extent -- which materials to teach it with. Teachers and local school boards are required by law to follow this curriculum and the provincial government from time to time may evaluate students, teachers, and school boards by requiring students in certain grades to write standardized examinations. In this system the provincial government, through its department of education, decides what is "educational" and to a large degree the materials with which and method by which it will be taught. Though there may be some degree of "input" and "feedback" from professional teachers in the classroom, curriculum decisions are formed and implemented by other professional "experts." These experts, to a large degree, are isolated from membership in the teaching profession, by their placement in the departmental bureaucracy and are responsible primarily to their political masters. These politicians in turn are influenced by many factors or interests such as business, industry, or a perceived need on the part of the electorate, or some significant portion of the electorate, for an "educational fix" for some social, economic, or other problem area. Regardless of the specific mechanism, by its nature, the state's concerns are with whatever is interpreted as the collective interest of society, as opposed to what may be seen as the interests of the student or the teacher, and this orientation inevitably is displayed in the curriculum.

The autonomy of the local administration which is charged with the specific establishment and day to day operation of the schools, including the direct employment of teachers is, itself highly mediated. These organizations are created by provincial legislation and tend to depend, especially in the case of smaller localities and poorer localities, upon provincial funding and expertise. However, school districts may make some curricular decisions in areas which the provincial government has decided neither to prescribe nor to

proscribe. Since she is employed by the local administration, this is the bureaucracy the teacher finds herself most directly a part of. Many of the day to day aspects such as physical environment, supply procedures, student discipline, specific rates of pay, career advancement, interpersonal relations, and professional accountability are initially -- at least -- handled at this level. The local administration decides where a teacher will be placed and conditions within that administration may determine how far a teacher may advance within that school system.

Through the teachers' association locals teachers negotiate with local districts over pay and questions of conditions of employment and work. Often it is in this area where the multidimensional/ambivalent nature of teachers' roles become apparent; where the responsibility to provide a service comes into conflict with the interests of the organization of teachers qua organization. And this highlights one aspect of the mediated nature of this occupation: as employees of an organization such as the state, or in Alberta's case, the state mediated and represented by the local school district, when teachers, through their organization wish to withdraw services from their employer -- over a matter of principle or for more mundane remunerative reasons -- they also withdraw services from those they have a professional obligation to, and are paid to, service -- their students.

The other forms of occupational control adumbrated by Johnson and mentioned above are not faced with this particular situation in their provision of services, at least in their "purer" forms,[19] for reasons which are based on the nature of power relations between the professional and the consumer of his/her service and the fact that services are usually rendered on a fee-for-service basis rather than as a salary which is usually the case for teachers and other mediated forms of occupational control.

This issue demonstrates the ambivalence which existing structures create for the classroom teacher. On the one hand it ensures a certain level of economic security for the teacher by providing employment and a guaranteed market, through the provision of schools and compulsory schooling laws. On the other hand, by prescribing curriculum,

and other aspects of the way public education is practised the governmental institutions and universities deprive teachers, in the same moment, from the kind of control which collegial professionalism, as a form of occupational control, has traditionally exercised over the provision of services and the nature of practice, in occupations typified by this form, such as medicine and law.

The bureaucracies established in various educational institutions cause teachers to leave the practice of their profession, in the circumscribed area of the classroom, if they wish to advance their careers as administrators, researchers, academics, or resource personnel.[20] The position of schools at the end of these bureaucratic structures is a factor of the teachers' "front-line" position regarding the people they are servicing, the students. The mass nature of public schooling has also ensured that even though education is conceived of as a service, there is a high degree of land and capital in the mix of its factors of production -- again legitimizing the development of bureaucratic structures to exercise a control function.

Conclusion

At the bottom of this elaborate creation is the fact that some notion of education is important to the modern state and as Braverman and Lasch suggest this notion of education contains a large element of socialization to the political and economic "norms" or "ideals" of the modern corporate state.[21] The form of educational institutions developed within the modern state to serve this function replaced, or attempted to replace, older forms of institution -- including the family, apprenticeships, and the church in performing the same or similar functions -- as the division of labour created initially during the Industrial Revolution, in turn created what Johnson has termed "structures of uncertainty." The attempt at ameliorating the tension thus created resulted in producers of discrete goods and services in the industrial/capitalist society becoming indiscriminate consumers of the goods and services that society could produce.

Because of the scientific/rationalist cognitive bases of lawyers, doctors, engineers, and accountants and the fact that these occupations oriented and produced their services in ways which were complementary to the modern capital/industrial oriented state these professions were allowed, initially at least, to develop forms of occupational control with little interference from the state. However, the eventual breakdown of institutions which had traditionally generated social control and cohesion required state intervention to produce new institutions and the people who would be members of them. This intervention has continued, both to ensure the economic survival of these institutions, such as schools, and to ensure that the functions of socialization are maintained. It is important to note, that public schools as we know them exist historically mainly because of their socializing function.

Thus the modern teacher in a public school finds that the interests of her students -- as individuals, as scholars, educationally -- are often mediated by, or interpreted from, the point of view of becoming part of a larger economic/political structure. The teacher, for better or worse, finds herself propagandizing for the status quo, or at least some significant part of the status quo. Or from another perspective, a certain bureaucratic imperative is asserted: "education" is seen in terms of passing from one grade to the next, completing some form, or getting a certain certificate. What is done or learned in achieving this is seen as instrumental and of no value in itself or for any higher purpose.

The teacher may be seen as the interpreter of society and its heritage, or as its representative to the students, or occasionally as their advocate to the powers-that-be. From these loci many consequences may follow. What should a teacher be? Should she reject the role of socializer to concentrate on some "higher" educational purpose? Should the teacher act within the realm of educational institutions and beyond as an advocate of her students' interests? Given the social/mass construction of formal institutions of education in this century how should teachers reconcile the "medium" of the school with important educational "messages"? Many of these and other substantial questions about the practice

and profession of teaching seem to revolve around how we interpret the modern setting for education, or at least schooling. In the next chapter I will discuss why it is important to take account of the influence of this setting when discussing these and other normative questions about teaching.

Chapter One: Footnotes

1. Terence J. Johnson, Professions and Power (London, 1972), pp. 45-47.

2. Ibid., pp. 21-30.

3. Ibid., pp. 32-37.

4. Ibid., pp. 41-45.

5. Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital (New York, 1974), p. 281.

6. Johnson, Professions, p. 45.

7. Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism (Berkeley, 1977), pp. 25-31.

8. Johnson, Professions, p. 65

9. See Larson, Chapter 9, "The Rise of Corporate Capitalism and the Consolidation of Professionalism" in Rise, pp. 136-158. See also Joel Spring's disucssion in Chapter 1 of Education and the Rise of the Corporate State (Boston, 1972), pp. 1-21.

10. Johnson, Professions, pp. 78-79.

11. Larson, Rise, p. 179.

12. Braverman uses the latter term, while Spring uses the former, and Larson tends to use either term interchangeably. What they refer to is the tendency of capital to accumulate and concentrate in fewer and fewer organizations thus productive capacity tends to reside in fewer and fewer places. It is often contrasted with the entreprenuerial phase which proceeded it.

13. Larson, Rise, p. 66.

14. Charles Derber, "The Proletarianization of the Professional: A Review Essay" In Professionals as Workers: Mental Labor in Advanced Capitalism, ed Charles Derber (Boston, 1982), p.13.

15. Unless otherwise noted specific examples will be drawn from and refer to Alberta. For my purposes here, the structure of formal institutions for public education in Alberta is similar enough to that in the rest of Canada and other industrialized nations to illustrate a specific case of the details of mediation of the profession. Though the details of these structures may vary, they all provide mediation in a similar, if not identical manner.

16. See Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissim (New York, 1978), p.136. See also Allison Prentice, The School Promoters (Toronto, 1977), passim.

17. Larson, Rise, pp. 197-198.

18. The exceptions to this general rule are counties, where the school board and county council are identical, and in the case of remote or widely dispursed school divisions which may be set-up and partially or wholly under provincial government administration.

19. In Canada recently we have seen the medical profession somewhat mediated by the introduction of medicare schemes. As a result there have been some instances of collective action to withhold services by doctors when they disagree with the policies and practices of the governments which administer these schemes.

20. Such as employees of the Department of Education or of a large school district, who may provide curricular or in-service training or advice to practicing teachers.

21. See Braverman, Monopoly, pp. 287-288, and Lasch, Narcissism, p. 136.

CHAPTER TWO

TREATMENTS OF PROFESSIONALISM AND TEACHING IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION.

The purpose of the preceding chapter was to outline a description of teaching as a mediated professionalized form of occupational control in our "post-industrial" or "monopoly capital" society. The specific form of these occupational activities within educational institutions is important to note in our society, but I think an argument may also be made that within any society which has formalized a largely sui generis set of educational institutions, that the very existence of these institutions implies that they carry-out some social function which to a lesser or greater extent may be seen as "socialization" and will mediate, limit, or legitimize any implicit or explicit psychological, phenomenological, "educational," or other purpose the institution may be said to serve.

So when it is noted by analysts[1] of the teacher-learner/pupil relationship that it is a social relationship -- a "social activity" -- it is important to keep in mind it is social not only because it takes place between two or more people, but also because the institutional environment within which it exists was sanctioned and established by society as part of the social organization-at-large. The structure of laws, regulations, rules, mores, and norms created for these purposes has effects on the pedagogic relationship and should not be disregarded or regarded as simply a neutral field in which this relationship exists.

In order to rationally discuss teaching as an activity subject to some form of occupational control, status, training, or other imperatives we must take care in descrying the important or salient factors which will obtain to affect our argument. Further, to advance normative statements on a given situation we must be sure our understanding and description of the situation includes all the details which may affect the potential achievement of the normative prescription. In discussing teaching many philosophers of education seem to be guilty of what may be called the "Dumbo Fallacy," that is they

dismiss or fail to regard what the mass of the elephant means for what it actually can do, while they note that -- with its big floppy ears -- it ought to fly.

This fallacy presents itself on two interrelated fronts in considerations of teaching as a professionalized occupational activity. One is in consideration of teachers as a professional group. The second, to which much greater attention has been paid in the philosophy of education, is to the consideration of what activities can be identified as "teaching."

Teaching as an Occupation

a) John Wilson

Remarkably little has been written in a philosophical way about the "professional" aspects of teachers and teaching. However, in his article, "The Teaching Profession: a case of self-mutilation," John Wilson attempts to make some normative prescriptions which would, "... put teachers in the position of respect, authority and honour ... they deserve."[2] Essentially Wilson sees, "... certain prevailing attitudes, beliefs and ideologies within (the teaching) profession," to be at odds with achieving the obvious, to him, goals of teachers and educators -- "... of being seen and treated as members of a genuine profession, as experts in their own right, on the (partial) analogy of doctors, lawyers, engineers and others."[3] Wilson's idea and ideal of professionalism, here, seems explicitly drawn from inappropriate historical models from which the most salient feature which emerges for Wilson in his simplistic adumbration of professional characteristics is the fact that professionals must, in order to be recognized as professionals, be able to claim some standard of expertise in a particular field of human service.

Wilson then goes on to note that in the fields of health, engineering, and business management sui generis but externally verifiable standards may be set quite uncontroversially. But in teaching and education there are no, "... very obvious built-in standards of merit or excellence."[4] At this point rather than ask how the fact that such

standards do not so obviously obtain in this field might make teaching and education different from doctoring and medicine, Wilson asserts that in spite of any difficulties in formulating any such standards, teachers should make some up or find some which will then make their occupation like medicine, engineering, or business management and presumably worthy of the respect and status they enjoy.

Wilson recognizes the mediation of the state in education and sees it as undermining the teaching profession's autonomy. He bemoans the "political and ideological pressure"[5] which schools are subject to and to which teachers must respond. Rather than recognize that these conditions might mark some crucial structural and value differences between education and the other professions he chooses to allude to, Wilson seems to be saying that with a little ear stretching and nose pulling we can turn this hippo of an occupation into an elephant and get it airborne yet!

What is Wilson's prescription for getting teachers soaring in the upper social strata with the other professional pachyderms? Which set of standards will make teachers autonomous, free from "ideology" and state mediation? He calls for a return to the standards of the "upper-middle class or upwardly-mobile middle class." These values are represented by the "... older universities, the soi-disant public schools, the grammar schools," and "... incorporated a certain view of culture, morality and the educated person, in terms of intellectuality and high culture."[6] It would seem that instead of gaining autonomy, by cleaving to the interests of this class, teachers would be replacing their mediated, if potentially marginal, status with regard to a state that is at least nominally democratic, with patronage by a socio-economic minority. Now it is true that such a prescription could very well do much toward making teachers, as an occupational group, very similar to professions such as engineers and business managers, whose skills and standards directly serve the interests of only a very few. Wilson makes very clear his disapproval of "egalitarian"[7] educational views and surely his emphasis and stipulative inference that only one class may have a truly "educational" set of standards would do

much to vitiate at least one standard that most teachers in the "maintained" or publicly supported schools would agree on: the necessity for widespread educational opportunity in a democratic society. Indeed that is an explicit rationale for having "maintained" schools.

It is easy to agree with Wilson that attempting to achieve this goal in a society which attempts a degree of substantial democracy along with any sort of pluralism will run into problems of contradictory values, but his atavistic and simplistic solution seems to be throwing the baby out with the bath water. He would have teachers discard an important value in order to adopt some "standards" which may be of dubious worth, for an apparently even more dubious cause -- social advancement of the profession.

The "educational" values of the "upper-middle class" which Wilson admires are not held by this class simply by coincidence and rejected by other classes arbitrarily. These values are a product of, and adjunct to, the maintenance of substantive differences in power and material culture within the class structure. Wilson's disdain for trying to change those differences through the educational system is clear throughout this essay. His misunderstanding of the sociological concept of "profession" leads him to misconstrue (as perhaps those he rails against have also misconstrued) the effective role the occupation of teaching may take in modern society.

If, as he indicates at the beginning of his essay, teachers deserve prestige and status, let it be because they try to maintain an ethical, if "ideological," standard of egalitarianism and not because they toady to some privileged class. That teachers do not enjoy this prestige and status perhaps indicates something about the "democratic" nature of society and the real possibilities of schooling or "education" in rectifying that situation. Attempts to realize "equality of opportunity" are frustrated by the very real inequalities in material condition. The meritocratic legitimation of inequality, upon which "professionalism" is based, is seen as a sham as the efforts of teachers to change the fortunes of their lower-class students come to naught. Wilson's cynical response to this is

to decry the motivating force -- a desire for equality -- and revert to an older and less moral status quo where inequalities were preserved without a qualm.

b) Glenn Langford

Glenn Langford's adumbration of the substance of professions and their characteristics in Teaching as a Profession is lengthier, and more thoughtful and more complex than Wilson's. There is much to recommend in his insights into the social aspects of professional activities, especially teaching. Though the depiction of professional functions, institutions and activities is more detailed than that in Wilson's brief article, it still suffers from a lack of critical insight, for while Langford emphasizes the broader social functions of professional teaching,[8] he fails to place teaching in any but the most simplistically phenomenological way within the broader context of its actual institutional/historical arrangements within the social setting. Thus he fails to detail the power relations which exist in society at large and in the actual social/political/economic realm of education in particular. It would seem for Langford that the purposeful organization of a teaching profession was as uncontroversial as the founding of a club for red-headed persons.[9]

Langford makes the assumption that since societies (or as he prefers, communities) "share" values -- indeed this "sharing" is one of the things which identifies them as coherent societies or communities -- then given those values which everyone accepts, the society is essentially a neutral field within which professions may form to meet specific needs with their expertise. Langford identifies this as a "purposive" view and dismisses any substantive inquiry into the specific effects of the institutional practice of education or any other profession as "causal," "empirical," and a subject for the field of sociology rather than philosophy.[10]

Using a term like "sharing," as Langford does in this context may be misleading, for it implies a willing, rational, and egalitarian acceptance of these values and consequently an equitable distribution of the benefits from the social manifestations that these values lead

to. But "sharing" can have other, less pleasant, connotations which might be more appropriate. An older sibling, for example, may force a younger one to "share" her Hallowe'en candy. A person with a cold may "share" viruses with others.

In a similar fashion, though most in a society may "share" in valuing the law, only those that can afford a good lawyer may benefit from any idiosyncrasies it might have. Likewise, "health" may be universally shared as a value, but those that can afford the best health care are likely to benefit the most from the creation of a profession to meet the needs generated by such a social value. Likewise, considerations of the content of schooling aside, those most able to defer the benefits to productivity an education might bring, are likely to benefit, economically at least, the most from education. The reasons for people sharing values -- from which they may benefit only tangentially or vestigially, if at all -- may be very complex, having to do with false consciousness and the fact that they may not "share" values in the same way or for the same reasons. This aspect becomes less ambiguous when considering patronized professions such as accounting or business management. The benefits of the services of these types of occupations flow most directly to an influential or important minority in society, though others may value the product of their services for the rationality it appears to lend society or for the opportunities such professions seem to present for status advancement through the area of employment or "career."

With reference to power relations in teaching, again Langford avoids the specific. He makes the important, though not uncontentious, point that teachers owe their primary duty to their employer and not to the children who are the subjects of their practice, which is a special but subsidiary concern,[11] but seems to have little else of substance to say about how teachers deal with formulating any degree of autonomy -- or even if they should -- regarding their special area of expertise. What is their role in relation to the state, the parents, and the children? What kind of ethical stance can be formulated with regard to practice? These are questions of the sort that Langford fails to deal with.

Teaching as an Activity

Another permutation of the "Dumbo Fallacy," when considering teaching is to ignore its structural constraints as a professionalized form of occupational control in order to try and distill some essential description of what activities may be called "teaching." The attempt at a description or definition of these activities becomes highly circumscribed, as Peter Goldstone indicates, when it is caught-up with a stipulative notion of "education" as distinct from schooling.[12] Teaching and those activities of which it is comprised are seen to be solely dependent on this definition of education and to be independent of the actual institutional arrangements within which the education is supposed to be taking place.

This is seen for Paul Hirst when he makes a sharp distinction between teaching as an "enterprise" and teaching as an activity or group of activities which can be characterized by the intention of the teacher to bring about learning.[13] This characterization of teaching is quite elegant and useful but it suffers in perhaps two ways. First, by dismissing those other activities involved in the "enterprise" of teaching -- which Hirst trivializes by illustrating with such activities as pencil sharpening, window opening, and preventing a squabble between two pupils[14] -- he ignores, de-emphasizes, or dismisses many of the responsibilities and activities which professional teachers must consider and in which they must engage, given the bureaucratic forms of modern schools as institutions of education, in order to manifest their intention to teach. These activities and responsibilities -- from sharpening pencils to establishing and maintaining communication with others who may be concerned what a pupil or a class learns (this includes parents, other teachers, school administration, and the department of education) -- may affect or mediate both the specific intention and the activities by which Hirst characterizes the central activities of teaching.

Though Hirst is undoubtedly correct that teaching must intend learning, a professional teacher engaged in the "enterprise" of teaching -- for an afternoon, a term, or most of a lifetime -- must consider other factors in formulating her intent and her activities.

Hirst seems to realize this, to a certain extent, but he seems at a loss to effectively deal with such mediations.[15]

A second problem for Hirst's limited consideration of teaching develops when it is combined with his notion of what is educational -- or more specifically, in considerations of a notion of "liberal education." It would seem desirable if not necessary for those professionally engaged in the "enterprise" of teaching, as distinct from those only casually or (for some immediate purpose) instrumentally in the activities of teaching, that there should be some concern with a notion of "education." It is important to note that for Hirst the idea of intentionality for the teacher and learner is crucial if their relationship is to be seen as the rational exchange which characterizes his concept of liberal education.[16] It is this notion of liberal education which, for Hirst, would form the specific content of the teaching exchange. Those sorts of menial tasks which a teacher might do, such as sharpen pencils, open windows, or permit one of the class to go to the bathroom would thus not be seen as directly educational in the sense of initiation to "intellectual and moral habits appropriate to conversation (in the forms of knowledge.)"[17] As Goldstone indicates such a unitary approach[18] to a definition of teaching is bound to be so abstract as to be highly untenable in the actual world even if it were an accurate schemata of what it purports to be.[19] It is important to have standards for educational institutions, but standards should be an indication of acceptable degree, not a prescription of kind which may be widely at odds with conditions which can actually obtain -- especially where in order for such conditions to obtain some other, over-riding goal would be vitiated.

The normative characterization of a teacher which develops should not dismiss the actual psychological and social conditions which do obtain in institutions of education. Such prescriptions which ignore these conditions are liable to be of the "let them eat cake" variety and of very little practical worth. If the material conditions which exist, the resources which are available, are limited in such a way as to limit the type of education

Hirst is describing to only an elite, then does that justify ignoring or giving short-shrift to other practices of "schooling" and the people who are products of that "schooling?"

To be more explicit and specific it must be recognized that our society, nominally at least, has made a commitment to widespread educational opportunity in the form of various institutions of education. Again this emphasizes the importance of the multidimensional social concept of education in modern monopoly capital society. These arrangements exist because there is seen to be a social purpose for them. Given Hirst's definition of what is "educational" it is no wonder his model of a "teaching/learning" exchange between teacher and pupil includes only two people, much in the form of a Platonic dialogue, where A teaches X to B[20] and A intends to teach B X and B, if only because of A's pedagogical prowess, intends to learn X. The X in this case is likely to be some extraction from one of the "Forms of Knowledge" given Hirst's commitment to this as the basis for liberal education. This form of teaching and its substance are all right as far as they go but in both the form of the teaching activity and the substance of what is "educational" Hirst has twin blind spots which are aligned with each other.

Jane Martin indicates that when Hirst, and other philosophers sympathetic to his idea of liberal education, emphasize the intellectual and rational components of the human mind, they do so at the expense of the affective components of the same mind.[21] As Martin further indicates in her article on liberal education, those "non-cognitive" faculties which Hirst's concept of liberal education chooses not to deal with, do not remain neutral, static, or underdeveloped just because they are not explicitly directly dealt with in a narrowly prescribed course of rational, intellectual, "intentional" education.

Here may be seen a parallel flaw in Hirst's description of teaching as an activity which intends to bring about some specific learning manifest in a specific process, which as indicated above, in a liberal education is also logically or rationally intended. Hirst goes so far as to deliberately exclude unintended learning as not the "central" business of schools.[22] This de-emphasis may be mistaken and the use of the word "intended"

misleading as Hirst here seems to ascribe "unintended" as necessarily having a quality of "randomness," and while some of the "unintended" learning which goes on in a school environment may be coincidental or as a result of happenstance, other "unintentional" learnings may be the "byproduct" or "side-effect" of a regularized program or system in the school or from the particular pedagogical method used by the teacher or even as a result of the interaction of personalities in the classroom. These learnings which Hirst wishes to ignore are also likely to be in areas which are "non-cognitive."

At this point one could say that a good teacher would teach all or most of what she "intended" and minimize the learnings which might distract from the "intended" lesson. Or she could harness these distractions to her "intention," and certainly the situation in which Socrates and Plato and our friends, A and B, found themselves this could, and was the likely case. But in the real world of systems of mass education such conditions which are convivial to this ideal are not likely to obtain for a multiplicity of reasons.

Of course this limited notion of teaching activities, where teachers are concerned primarily only with what they may logically, rationally, intellectually, "intend" fits very well with a liberal notion of what education is when it consists of things easily intended, such as cognitive forms of knowledge. The problem for the teacher in appealing primarily to the cognitive faculties is that the noncognitive faculties also assert themselves to varying degrees in all students, whether the teachers or the students intend them or not. They often cannot be ignored, discounted, or simply used in some instrumental fashion because they will develop or regress or be frustrated in varying degrees if teachers do not deal with them explicitly and directly.

To ignore or de-emphasize this affective component of the developing human mind in formulations of what learning can be "intended" and of what counts as educational and to discount considering the possible manifestations of this component in consideration of teaching are mistakes. To do so presents an inaccurate picture -- or description -- from which mistaken ideals -- in the form of normative statements are derived -- about what

teaching is and ought to be. By de-emphasizing or ignoring the mediating aspects of the activities of professional teaching from the trivial to the crucial which are involved in the "enterprise" of teaching -- from sharpening pencils to curricular control -- a necessary ingredient in the modern institutionalization of education is lost: the fact that individual teachers must deal with their pupils in bureaucratized settings. It is within these settings -- over which neither the student or the teacher has entire control -- that the teacher must attempt to consider the processes of learning, both cognitive and affective, and "intentional" and "unintentional" -- though in this context these latter terms seem ill-suited -- within which the student will participate with the teacher in order to attempt to become education.

Conclusion

In considering the professionalized activities of teachers it is important to have an adequate description of the actual conditions which obtain in our "educational" institutions. By ignoring the social nature of educational activities and institutions in the larger sense, and by discounting the explicit particular and general socializing functions of the institutions of professionalism and education Wilson, Langford, and Hirst miss the mark in trying to delineate and prescribe for teachers and their working lives. It is unlikely these institutions would exist unless they performed these primary social functions; therefore, to deny or ignore these functions seems self-defeating if there is to be any meaningful application for teachers.

The limited notion of what teaching and education are fits very well with the conventional notion of what a profession is as it sets a clear, apparently unambiguous body of knowledge and techniques out as a legitimate area of practice, seemingly subject to an externally justifiable set of standards -- "Forms of Knowledge" for Hirst, upper middle class values for Wilson. But outside some homogeneous society, group, community, or class this type of education and this type of teaching are likely to produce more problems

for a society such as ours than it would solve, primarily because it would be accessible and useful to only a few.

As Wilson indicates in his essay, attempts to broaden the social base of school-based education are fraught with problems and ambiguities. By making education a social, economic, and political concern we have removed it, historically, from the realm of restricted interests and influence, though --- as indicated in discussing Langford's depiction of professions -- this does not mean that the interest and influence of certain groups has not dominated educational policy. These interests have had, however, to consider the "mass" in their policies and make provision for them.

This broadening of educational opportunity obviously has had an effect on our consideration of what is "educational." Too often this is seen as a dilution of standards, when, in fact, teachers have gone from teaching the very few, certain things appropriate to their social station, to teaching the very many ... Well, what becomes the imperative: social control, economic "progress," or some abstract, if worthy, ideal?

As indicated in the previous chapter, our institutions of professionalism and education developed in their specific bureaucratic forms as a response to the needs and dominant interests of a monopoly capitalist society. The mediated nature of the teaching profession and the ambiguity resulting from the seeming multiplicity of goals and techniques in education points to the complexity and dynamic tension which education is subject to in our society. The effective resolution of this tension is not likely to be found following normative expressions based on descriptions of these institutions with their accompanying activities which do not attempt to take into account the sources of these tensions or even that there are significant social sources for these. For teachers to ignore the power relations in their "professional life" and to ignore the affective component of their students' lives in the pursuit of some highly denatured notions of professionalism or education -- even if they could do so in a largely uninhibited manner -- would be mistaken. But, while elephants, by their nature cannot fly, they may do many other remarkable things.

Chapter Two: Footnotes

1. See Glenn Langford, Teaching as a Profession (Manchester, 1978), p. 1, and James E. McClelland's discussion of social "practices" in Philosophy of Education (Englewood Cliffs, 1976), pp. 1-5.

2. John Wilson, "The Teaching Profession; a case of self-mutilation" in Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1986, p. 245.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., p. 246.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., p. 245.

8. Langford, Teaching, p. 44.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., pp. 107-108.

11. Ibid., pp. 7 and 94.

12. Peter Goldstone, "The Metaphysics of Teaching: Nature and Artifice/Unity and Plurality" in Philosophy of Education 1983, ed. Robert E. Roemer (Normal, 1984), p. 83.

13. P. H. Hirst, "What is Teaching?" in The Philosophy of Education, ed. R. S. Peters (London, 1973), pp. 164-168.

14. Ibid., p. 164. Note here that in many ways a professional teacher must take-up what Hirst sees as the "enterprise" of teaching.

15. See, Hirst, "What is Teaching?" pp. 175-176, where he briefly discusses the problems his approach would have being applied in a classroom situation.

16. P. H. Hirst, "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge" in The Philosophy of Education, ed. R. S. Peters (London, 1973), p. 93, for example.

17. Michael Oakeshott as quoted in Hirst, "Liberal Education," p. 111.

18. Goldstone, "Metaphysics," pp. 84-85.

19. See Jane Roland Martin, "Needed: A New Paradigm for Liberal Education" in Philosophy and Education, Eightieth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, ed. Jonas F. Soltis (Chicago, 1981), where she presents the case that Hirst and his followers may have committed the "Epistomological Fallacy" in selecting their "Forms of Knowledge."

20. Hirst, "What is Teaching?" p. 171.

21. See Martin, "Paradigm" p. 49, and "Taking Sophie Seriously" in Philosophy of Education 1983, ed. Robert E. Roemer (Normal, 1984), p.54.

22. Hirst, "What is Teaching?" pp. 169-170.

CHAPTER THREE

A CONSIDERATION OF SOCIAL FORMS, COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVES, AND NON-MORAL BEHAVIOR.

If the treatment offered the professional aspect of teaching by conventional philosophers of education is limited and misleading when judged by standards based on developments in sociological research; perhaps a more adequate way of considering teaching and its professional aspects may be developed. Such a treatment would need to incorporate an adequate world view or social philosophy if it is to avoid falling into recuctionist fallacies, such as those outlined in the previous chapter, about the teacher's role and abilities. Simultaneously it must assume a viable notion in the area of ethics and moral philosophy not only to make normative statements, but also to form the basis for an adequate and realistic pedagogy. However, as Iris Murdoch has noted, following Hume, "... good political philosophy is not necessarily good moral philosophy."[1] The obverse may also be true: that in addressing what are felt to be the concerns of moral philosophy, we may ignore the consequences of our address in the sphere of social and political concern.

But for professional teachers a philosophical viewpoint in which these two spheres complement, rather than contradict or simply lack relevance for one another, must be developed. Each term in the phrase, "professional teacher," emphasizes both aspects of philosophical concern. Being any sort of professional means assuming a certain social role -- for better or worse -- with certain ethical responsibilities. Being a teach implicates the individual and the profession, not only in the regeneration of social structures, but in the regeneration of moral values, as well.[2] If there is little or not complementarity between

these aspects, the professional teacher's task becomes paradoxical and it is very likely neither aspect will be done well.

In this chapter I will attempt to establish, in at least a limited sense, such a harmony between a view of society and of the specific moral concern, of the possible source of unethical or non-moral behavior. I further hope to demonstrate some of the implications this might have for teachers. In contrast to those philosophers examined in the previous chapter, who were critiqued for their limited view of the teacher and the isolated role she plays in the process of "education," an adequate, if rudimentary adumbration of the social context and its relationship of reciprocal effect with the individual will be presented. From this point an effective ethic for dealing with immanent and explicit concerns may be developed. To refer again to the previous chapter -- this process may be seen as getting the lay of the elephant correct, before deciding what it ought to do, or we ought to do with it.

The obvious danger in this approach is that moral and ethical standards may be seen as conditional upon social structures or derived from them by some naturalistic and facile method. I hope to avoid this, in the substance of my argument, by showing that while there is a relationship between these two philosophical aspects of teaching it is not simply one of cause and effect determinism. Rather, this relationship is one -- as alluded to above -- of reciprocal effect, mutual causation, or -- in other words -- a dialectical relationship.

I will review here two views of the relationship which develops, dialectically, between individuals and their social environment. The first view is that developed by Christopher Lasch in his description of the concept of the "narcissistic" consciousness to explain alienation and the consequent diminished capacity for moral agency within individuals and increased tendency for social disintegration in modern society. The second view is here presented as an attempt at synthesizing the thought of several feminist scholars. It too deals with the question of alienation, in its various forms, expressed as sexism and explores the broader aspects of social and moral concern which this raises.

I have chosen these alternative explorations, not because they greatly contrast with each other in their critical analyses -- though in some details and on some points they do. But because they come to very similar conclusions -- diagnoses -- even though they apparently start from such different points and review, in general, such different data in those analyses.

These diagnoses each point to the tendency of modern post industrial society to reproduce -- not a coherent version of itself, inhabited by individuals possessed of integrated personalities, who have not only moral vision, but who also behave morally. Instead society reels under ever more drastic measures to cope with the effects of the alienation it produces in its inhabitants. Lasch and the feminist scholars provide insight into this alienation, its genesis, and its effects on moral development and moral behavior.

With one exception, that of Jane Roland Martin, none of the people studied in this chapter speak extensively and explicitly of the philosophy of education, though Lasch does speak of the history of curricular development in universities. There are none-the-less important points raised by them for teachers, both as professionals and as pedagogues.

Alienation and Morality I - Christopher Lasch

In two works, The Culture of Narcissism[3] and The Minimal Self,[4] Christopher Lasch traces the relationship between the social (cultural, economic, political, et al.) forms which have developed in America since the nineteenth century and the emergence of the "narcissistic" self as a manifest form of consciousness. In outlining and detailing this relationship Lasch provides a dynamic and organic view of the relationship between the macrocosm of cultural, social, economic, and political affairs and the mirocosm of individual consciousness. In doing so Lasch provides an analysis of the specific psychological manifestation of alienation in the United States and similar societies in the contemporary world.

Marx emphasized the process of production as the locus for alienation in emerging industrial societies. The extraction of surplus value from the labour of the proletariat and their consequent marginal living conditions were seen as alienation itself, which also produced a host of other phenomena, which were themselves seen as alienation or aspects of alienation -- these included the alienation of the consciousness.[5]

For Lasch, whose analysis of monopoly capital seems substantially identical to that referred to in chapter one of this thesis, the locus of alienation in a monopoly capital or post-industrial society shifts somewhat from the productive processes to the processes of consumption of goods and services. It is important to note that the relationship between production and consumption and their respective processes is itself dialectical. As such it is often difficult to separate, causally and historically, the manifestations of one process from the other. This seems increasingly so in the modern and contemporary phases of monopoly capitalism, where an increasing proportion of resources is devoted to the creation, management, and enhancement of consumption -- that is, the production of consumption. The advertising industry is only the most obvious manifestation of this. The political economy of this whole process is obviously very complex but the whole notion of mass production, which is the hallmark of monopoly capital, must be predicated on notions of: mass consumption aided and abetted by the mass media and the social and political infrastructures provided by the state. It is the consumption of goods and services produced by monopoly capital and the parallel processes of "receiving" the communications of the mass media and "participating" in the programs of the government which Lasch focuses on and demonstrates as sources of alienation, particularly of the individual consciousness.

This sort of analysis, which Lasch outlines and details, is most convincing for it demonstrates how widespread alienation can exist at a psychological level in a society where the extreme manifestations of exploitation in the processes of production, such as those Marx witnessed, have been localized or exported, if not entirely eliminated. That is to say, even if the great mass of people in a monopoly capital society are not suffering in

extreme poverty, and particularly among those who are not suffering in extreme poverty and who may, indeed, participate in a very comfortable material "life-style," alienation may be a significant factor in their psychological processes.

This is not just some abstract point, for in working-out the psycho-social dialectic of alienation for this society and these individuals, Lasch demonstrates that alienation is not an inevitable or essential factor in human nature or the human condition, as an existentialist point of view might suggest. Neither is it completely determined by material forces outside the human consciousness as a simplistic and mechanical interpretation of Marx could indicate. Rather, the genesis of alienation has historic roots and contemporary branches in the relationship between social (cultural, etc.) forms and the types of consciousness.

About the former part of the synthetic dyad of social forms and the type of consciousness, there should be little immediate confusion. It could include many things on many scales: A large corporation and the skyscraper which houses it; a "Tupperware" party; a police force; a political campaign; or a class in a modern public school. All of these in one way or another have been seen as the products of human thought. Although, dialectically speaking, this is not wholly correct, it does serve to indicate that social forms are human products and not something which have been imposed arbitrarily at a point in history by extra-human power or spontaneously, specifically, and immutably generated from a fixed human nature.

What the "types of consciousness" are is harder to illuminate. Terms such as "world view" or "point of view" may be common synonyms for this. From the area of psychological anthropology the equivalent concepts might be those of eidos and ethos, as developed by Bateson;[6] where the former is the "culturally standardized mode of cognition," and the latter is the "culturally standardized emotional tone."[7] The type of consciousness can be characterized as containing the predominant modes or paradigms of thought along with the value concerns of a given period or a certain society. Knowing or being able to characterize a type of consciousness would not necessarily allow one to

predict in any specific way the contents or dynamics of the consciousness of an individual said to possess that type of consciousness.

However "natural" many of our ways of thinking about the world and ourselves may seem, however "instinctive" our emotional response to certain situations and events, however self-evident our evaluation of human behavior, institutions, and artifacts may seem; there is a large degree of consistency produced by the interaction of the consciousness with the social forms in the process we call "socialization." Just as in dialectical terms, social forms with their own dynamics and synthetic histories are not made out of whole cloth by the activities of human consciousness(es); neither is the outline of an individual's consciousness formed simply in and by socially predicated activity.

Social forms and the type of consciousness are synthetic products and mediating agencies neither or which springs, immanent, from their own dialectic. More basic postulates are needed to explain, in dialectical terms, the existence of alienation which may be seen both as a product of the synthetic process and as evidence of the failure of this process in individual human and in social terms. The "given" social forms and the contemporary type of consciousness fail to fulfill the requirements of "History" (seen here as the continuing project of attempting to establish stable social forms) one one side; or the requirements of "Human Nature" (that is, the desire for a type of consciousness which provides a large degree of coherence for individuals) on the other.

It is not my intention, or within the scope of this exposition, to discuss or debate whether these more basic concepts, "History" and "Human Nature," rank as meta-concepts; whether one or both are mutable or immutable; neither is it necessary, here, to posit either with any particular specific features.[8] What is sufficient at this point is to indicate that in any given moment in the dialectical process, if the requirements of "History" are not met by existing social forms, and the type of consciousness which maintains them; or if the imperatives of "Human Nature" cannot be dealt with by a certain type of

consciousness in its interplay with social forms, then alienation will manifest itself in certain specific cultural and psychological forms.

Lasch posits that in a society of mass production and consumption, where the dominant media of communication are themselves formed by the imperatives of mass production and consumption, and where the social infrastructure is also abstractly institutionalized along the lines of industrial bureaucracy; the predominant type of consciousness will be a "narcissistic" one. As Lasch makes clear this "narcissism" is not one of "self-seeking egoism"[9] where the individual attempts to dominate and control his or her environment to his or her own ends. Rather narcissism causes individuals to withdraw into the self, with a hampered capacity to distinguish between the self and any sort of reliable objective world of "other."

In a large-scale industrial society the specialization in the productive processes required by the division of labour erodes competencies in individuals to be self-sufficient in producing goods and services to meet their subsistence and other needs. This is a basic aspect of Marx's concept of alienation. It also means they must become dependent on others to meet these needs. A further level of alienation is of course introduced because in both production and consumption the mutuality of the relations of dependency are mediated by the imperatives of capital and those who control it. That is to say, those who control capital are less dependent on those without that control, than those without capital are on them. There is an asymmetry in the relations of dependence which favours those with capital.

For Lasch the social forms which have apparently developed to oppose these mediations often do so in attempts to ameliorate or rectify the worst effects of these mediations on the workers and consumers. But they are predicated within the same social and cultural patterns, therefore they often, in the long term, contribute to the effect of alienation by further subverting the competencies of the individual, family, or community, thus reinforcing their position of subordinated dependence.

The mass media of communication, especially in the highly technological contemporary world, contribute to the corrosion of competency in two interconnected ways. First in the realm of advertising the media are used to promote the interests of capital in encouraging and developing mass consumption. Lasch explains how this is done:

> ... modern advertising seeks to promote not so much self-indulgence as self-doubt. It seeks to create needs, not to fulfill them; to generate new anxieties instead of allaying old ones.[10]

Second, the media, through modern technology present to the individual in the mass audience a very powerful but fractured and discontinuous sense of reality. It is powerful because of its verisimilitude and great sensory appeal as well as its ability to transmit vast amounts of information. In a society which sees knowledge as power, and views information as being synonymous with knowledge, this ability becomes highly valued.[11] The sense of reality is fractured and discontinuous both because of the intermittent and episodic way subjects are treated in the media and because the subtitles and nuance of specific individuals and local communities are either ignored or caricatured. The combined effect is to undermine, subvert, and corrupt both a valid sense of lived reality and the ability to establish such a sense. One's sense of reality becomes limited and confirmed by the television image. A corollary of this, which Lasch indicates, is that "credibility" becomes a more telling characteristic of something or someone the mass media present, than "truth" or "truthfulness."[12]

Again, the effect of the mass media and the other factors, such as the division of labour and the creation of techno-bureaucratic and professional social forms, as discussed in the first chapter, which attempt to create, transform, and meet the needs of individuals in a society such as ours, is one of alienation. The particular form this takes is documented by Lasch and explained by him through an extrapolation on Freudian psychoanalysis. Such a specific and authoritative detailing of "Human Nature" as Lasch borrows and adapts

from Freud allows for much clarity in his development of arguments, but it does not necessarily contribute to or detract from the veracity of his analysis or claims about alienation in the form of "narcissism."

Essentially, stripped of much of its Freudian vocabulary, Human Nature for Lasch is mutable through growth. That is to say, it should not display manifestations of the same needs and wants as an individual ages. As an infant the individual needs externally provided (imposed) security, even though the proto-consciousness of the very young child may not even realize there is an external world beyond his or her needs and wants. What should slowly evolve in the individual, along with a capacity to provide for his or her own security, is a developing sensitivity to an objective external world. Our awareness of this world shaped by our subjective interactions with it becomes manifest in consciousness.

If the ability to distinguish between "self" and the external or objective world ("other") is underdeveloped or damaged because the need for physical and emotional security is undermined in the functioning of social agencies -- from the nuclear family, to the mass media, and the agencies of production -- then the individual's ability to distinguish between the world of self and the world of other may be damaged. Characteristic of the narcissistic consciousness is a desire to deny t hat there is a dichotomy between self and other. This may be manifested in individual cases where a person attempts to follow some religious or secular cult or creed which denies the mediation of social forms (life on earth) and believes in a simply achieved immanence of, or transcendence for, union or reunion of the individual with cosmic forces or for personal integration or "self-fulfillment." As Lasch indicates the proliferation of "New Age" and Self-Awareness/-Help movements and charismatic religious groups with what Lasch terms a "therapeutic" sensibility, help to reinforce and exploit this desire.[13]

As well, individuals may develop various strategies out of a sense of ironic detachment. That is, there can be no significantly meaningful relationship between self and other, except one inverted and filtered by a sense of irony. Here the range can run from the

"survivalists" of the radical right, who prepare for, and look forward to, the collapse of a "decadent" culture with target practice and well-provisioned bunkers from which a new "civilization" will arise; to the pervasive apathy of individuals, who see day to day "coping" as their best strategy for dealing with the monolithic insensitivity and chaotic experience of a social "order" predicated upon "Total Institutions."[14]

The latter case is perhaps the most significant because it seems to be the reaction which is singularly most widespread. In all three cases -- cult member, survivalist, and apathetic citizen -- it may be seen how the damaged ability to mediate a sense of self and a sense of other has inhibited the ability to form coherent values and thus, people through their conscious activity cannot be either effective moral agents or effective citizens in an egalitarian society.

Perhaps more needs to be discussed at this point about the ability of the self to externalize (and by implication, internalize) and the ability to form a coherent system of values. Values are interesting, if nebulous things. To value something may be taken to mean that something is of great worth in exchanges in a market because of its relative scarcity compared to the demand (or expressed need) for it. But in the context discussed here this definition seems frivolous or at best a corollary to one which stresses that values are created or expressed when something becomes useful or meaningful to a consciousness. Thus an artist may value her brushes (or brushes in general) because they are useful in creating art and perhaps making a living. Or a person values a friend because they share interests or experiences which have lent significance to both their lives.

As the latter definition and illustration demonstrate, it is difficult to pin down what value is, without being tautological and emphasizing the relative and instrumental attributes of values and things valued respectively. It would seem from the above examples that things have value for a consciousness either because they help produce something of value (art, interesting experiences) or because they signify something valuable (a past interesting experience) or some combination of instrumentality -- of this sort -- and symbolism.

Conversely, these definitions and illustrations also demonstrate some important characteristics of the conscious process of valuing. First, valuing is done in establishing a sensibility of the relationship of self to the external world in both a concrete sense of becoming physically secure and in the more abstract process of trying to maintain cognitive and emotional equilibrium: that is, form a world view.

Second, as part of these processes, values come to exist in relationship to one another and the individual must have a conscious ability to make sense of these relationships, that is, get them to cohere.

It would seem to follow that one of the functions of a consciousness which has an impaired ability to distinguish self from other is going to be an impaired ability to adequately produce value judgements, except perhaps of a short-term market-utilitarian kind, judging predetermined scarcity and demand. Consequently, there is a reciprocal effect in the formation and reinforcement of social forms which obtain to this type of consciousness. The media cater to the "lowest common denominator" because that is what sells. The existence of a welfare system can be seen, in one sense, as undermining individual and community competencies for self-help and care.

The consequences for social and moral philosophy stemming from this analysis are of some moment. A society in which social forms synthesize widespread alienation in their dialectic with individual lives seems doomed to internal decay and disintegration. The ability of such a society to reproduce itself over several generations is likely to be discontinuous at best and abortive at worst. For moral philosophy it is important to realize that even if it is granted that those things which are seen to be "good" and of value are independent of social influence, that the process of expressing those values will take place in a social sphere and have consequences for the individual making the expression and for others. If the development of the process of valuing and evaluating -- that is, making value judgements -- is impaired in, or by the dialectic process of forming consciousness, then the ability of the individual to make moral judgements and decisions and act effectively on

those judgements and decisions will also be impaired. As Lasch says in The Culture of Narcissism,

> There is a close connection ... between the erosion of moral responsibility and the waning capacity for self-help ... between the elimination of culpability and the elimination of competence.[15]

It is important to note, here, that what Lasch refers to as "moral," in this instance, is the whole range of psycho-social activities in which individuals may be consciously and critically involved in their lives. In subsequently distinguishing between the art of "practical reason" and the mastery of "technique," Lasch makes this point clear:

> As work and politics lose their educative content and degenerate into pure technique, the very distinction between technique and practice becomes incomprehensible. Industrial societies have almost completely lost sight of the possibility that work and politics can serve as character-forming disciplines. These activities are now understood strictly as means of satisfying material needs. Moral ideas, meanwhile, lose their connection with practical life and with the virtues specific to particular practices and become confused instead with the exercise of purely personal choices and the expression of personal prejudices and tastes, which can be neither justified nor explained and which should therefore not be regarded as binding on anyone else.[16]

This then summarizes the broad outline of Lasch's discussion and diagnosis of alienation as it is manifest in our society at this point in history. Lasch also indicates a prognosis, to which I will refer in the next chapter.

Alienation and Morality II - A Feminist View

The questions raised from feminist points of view parallel the issues raised by Lasch. Within the philosophy of education, especially as it pertains to questions of moral education, there has been much discussion of whether there are such things as "masculine" or "feminine" points of view, world views, or cognitive perspectives which can be considered discrete from one another.[17] What is clear is that there is a feminist perspective, or more properly, as Susan Parsons suggests, there are feminist perspectives

on issues in the philosophy of education as it obtains especially in the discussion of morals and ethics.[18]

The common source of these perspectives is the undoubtedly accurate perception that historically great inequities have existed and do exist in the social roles and relationships of men and women. In tracing the history and delineating the manifestations of these inequities feminists have challenged mainstream -- some might say, "malestream" -- thought to account for them. Often this thought is criticized for being inherently sexist, that is protecting, enhancing, and securing the interests of one gender at the expense of the other. As Parsons points out, some feminists see these as primarily linguistic problems in defining and redefining categories for the consideration of women's rights within the present social structure. This she labels, the liberal approach.

Others see the differences set in the biologically determined differences in nature between men and women. These feminists tend to view the present oppression of women as a function of the immutable tension, if not antagonism, between the sexes. A third conception, which Parsons outlines, sees gender differences and inequities as a product of social forces which determine the values which people hold and upon which they act.

Though valuable insights for moral reasoning may be developed from each of these positions, they are each shown to have inherent flaws when developing a moral stance. The liberal view with its emphasis on the rational generation of abstract principles is seen as clinging to the status quo and rationalizing itself into inactivity or mere tokenism. Its ability to generate original critical insights is highly circumscribed by its dependence and emphasis on methods of rationality. The naturalistic perspective and that of social determinism have difficulty in generating a serious discussion of morals and moral issues. In the first case there is a tendency to see a specific morality as peculiar to each of the sexes and thus it denies the, "... impulse ... toward the general and inclusive ...,"[19] which should characterize moral thought. In the second case, the determination by various social forms of individual consciousness vitiates the idea of a moral order with individual moral agents.

Fortunately there are feminist thinkers who avoid the pitfalls and consequences of the extremes of these positions. Though there is much feminist thought which is not explicitly philosophical, a good deal of it carries implications which philosophers of morals and education might heed in formulating their thoughts in these areas. They pose challenges as to how we may consider the individual as moral agent and how and why we might foster moral agency.

Psychologist Carol Gilligan and sociologist Mary O'Brien have done much work in tracing the experiences of women. In the first case as individuals and in the second as a coherent group which is part of the dynamic of the social order.

Gilligan, like Christopher Lasch, sees moral development linked with self-image and human maturation and development.[20] She describes how two different ethics -- one of "justice" and one of "care" evolve to account for and deal with,

> The experiences of inequality and interdependence (which) are embedded in the cycle of life, universal because (they are) inherent in the relationship of parent and child.[21]

The rub is that as a society we have developed a form of discourse in ethics primarily for the ethic of justice, which according to Gilligan, in its methods and message tends to emphasize discerning differences, separateness, and evaluating objects and issues hierarchically to arrive at moral judgements.[22] A vocabulary for the ethic of care, she maintains, remains underdeveloped. It is an ethic which emphasizes the connections between people and the importance of understanding and maintaining human relationships.[23] This imbalance in the discussion of moral issues and in the historic ability to discuss moral issues has, as Gilligan sees it, two main effects.

The first, and primary one for her study, is the alienation of women from formal moral discourse. For what ever reason, women are socialized more into the ethic of care and this ethic is the one most of them internalize during their developmental processes. The "objective," "scientific" truth or validity of Gilligan's hypothesis is a matter for

psychological investigation, though she herself, of course, presents evidence from her own studies and interprets data from the studies of others with this view in mind.[24]

The second effect of ignoring and failing to develop a dialogue within the ethic of care, according to Gilligan, is that this "neglect" skews our thinking about morality, as it ceases to be concerned with the developmental processes humans undergo in society and of which moral growth is an important part. Gilligan sees the dialectical processes between the two ethics as historically becoming reified in a social order characterized by widespread gender inequality as well as other forms of domination and in the alienating psychological effects resulting from the recognition and promotion of one ethic, "justice," at the expense of "care," the other.

Jane Roland Martin, a cohort of Gilligan, deals with some of the philosophical and historical issues which Gilligan addresses. Martin's treatment of the former of these issues will be dealt with later in this section, where her expanded concept of moral thought in the area of moral pedagogy will be discussed. At this point, however, perhaps an understanding of a feminist notion of the social order is appropriate, as some of the distinctions which Mary O'Brien makes in The Politics of Reproduction[25] have consequences for and are complementary with Gilligan's feminist view of moral psychology and Martin's attempts to bring a feminist perspective to moral philosophy.

O'Brien proposes a materialist "political economy" which in many ways is parallel to Marx's materialist concept of history. Except where Marx bases his social theories on the dialectical processes of social production, O'Brien develops hers based on the dialectical and material processes of reproduction. These she sees in human terms as not only a biological process, but as a social process as well.[26] This subtle, but profound, shift in emphasis from production to reproduction is not only based on some genderized idea of the way things ought to be; O'Brien establishes some internal inconsistencies in Marx's thought, thus:

> In his analysis of labour process however, Marx analyses the product of production and simply neglects the product of consumption. For Marx ... the product of consumption is the reproduction of the life of the individual.[27]

This is a dialectical relationship between production and reproduction which Marx recognizes, then ignores, perhaps because of his genderized idea of the way things ought to be. O'Brien attempts to correct that neglect. Though she grants the biological/gender differences involved in the material basis of the reproductive process, O'Brien adumbrates the social, political, and economic consequences stemming from this basis and demonstrates that reproduction as a social phenomenon is a historical dialectical process which stems from the alienation men experience subsequent to the sex act in the physical process of reproduction.

Maternity and the subsequent/consequent emotional attachments and social responsibilities evolve from the continuity of the natural process of reproduction in women -- from the sex act, through conception, gestation, labour, birth, nursing and the subsequent proximity and dependence of the child. The concept of paternity, in contrast, is a social invention much like, and in some cases identical to, the idea of private property. As O'Brien sums it up, "Paternity ... is not a natural relationship to a child, but a right to a child."[28] The idea of paternity becomes particularly important in societies where property is distributed or inherited upon the basis of paternity, or at least socially sanctioned paternity.

The social organization of the family at one time in our society shared the functions of reproduction and production and the mutuality of these functions make it difficult to discretely discern which any specific activity, except those assigned to biological maternity above, was at a given time. O'Brien makes an insightful note about the fact of the social organization of the family, indicating an important aspect of it for this study.

> ... the family does have one characteristic which transcends the merely organic, and this has to do with its ethical aspect. The family is, as it were ethical by compulsion, an ethics quite different from that, for example, by which men learn

> the rational and noble morality of going to war, to kill and be killed in the imperative conservation of the society which they have made in unwitting compliance with cunning reason. The ethical essence of the family lies in the dependence of infants, which makes the first demand on people to think of the welfare of another rather than only on personal survival.[29]

Historically, with the development of industrial and post-industrial forms of capitalist economy (as has been detailed in chapter one of this thesis) not only have the tasks of production become more specialized and individuals more interdependent in their productive roles, those roles have become more discrete from the reproductive functions of the family which have until recently been explicitly assigned to the wife and mother, while the "productive" member of the family became the husband and father, who went to work each day as the "breadwinner." This bifurcation of roles and areas of concern brought about a change in the nature of the interdependence of familial relations as the husband/father became more singularly responsible and dominant in monetary matters, the rest of the family became economically dependent upon him.

The arrangement described above is obviously stereotypical, but it mirrors what was and is considered an ideal, where women look after most of the "private" affairs within the familial household and men support that family, materially, and otherwise deal, for the most part, with its public functioning. Institutional arrangements have generally supported this ideal -- from circumscribed legal rights for women to limited educational and job opportunities with reduced levels of income widely reported for women who dared to, or had to, labour in the productive sphere. As well, this ideal would be expressed in cultural forms from story books to television programs and other agencies of socialization -- including schools and the family itself.

For O'Brien the dominance of productive thought in the modern consciousness, and productive activities as determining aspects of modern social and material life, is the result of the elaborate historical reaction of men to their sense of alienation and discontinuity in the biological and generational process of reproduction. Again, as with

Gilligan, one thesis in the dialectic of modern consciousness of ethics and morals -- the material, social, and historical basis of reproduction -- has been lost due to the heretofore overwhelming material power of economic production and its attendant ideologies and ideological forms. This extends in the modern period of monopoly capitalism to the attempted expropriation of many of the family's reproductive functions into the productive sphere through the commodification of needs as discussed in the section on Christopher Lasch and in chapter one, above.

Jane Roland Martin in her critique of contemporary educational philosophy, particularly in its formulation of ideas of the "educated man" -- or as she prefers, the "educated person" -- and in outlining a curricular basis for a "liberal education," attempts to deal on a philosophical level with some of the psychological and sociological issues raised by Gilligan, O'Brien, and other feminist scholars.

In discussing the ideal of the "educated person" she discerns not only how this ideal as adumbrated by analytical philosophers of education, such as R. S. Peters and Paul Hirst, is alien and alienating to women and their acquired conception of self, she also identifies how this ideal places the conception of education within the productive sphere as it is identified by O'Brien and other feminists.[30] It must be noted, as Martin does, that this is a somewhat broader notion of "production" than Peters might ordinarily consider. Martin notes that, according to Peters and others, the ideally educated person would cleave fairly closely to the ideal male stereotype and be, "... objective, analytic, rational ... interested in ideas and things ..."[31] She subsequently notes:

> Although Peters' educated person is ill-equipped for jobs in trades or work on the assembly line, this person is tailor-made for carrying on certain of the productive processes of society, namely those which require work with heads, not hands. Thus his educated person is designed to fill a role in society which has traditionally been considered to be male. Moreover, he or she is not equipped by education to fill roles associated with the reproductive processes of society, i.e., roles traditionally considered to be female.[32]

Martin then argues that these latter traits must also be made part of the ideal of an educated person and thus of education, because the development of altruistic feelings and emotions, child-rearing skills, and the ability to form and transmit or reproduce meaningful values cannot be left to chance in a society as oriented toward, and overwhelmed by, productive concerns as is ours.[33] This further implicates the discipline of the philosophy of education in the "contingent"[34] consequences of educational thought -- the "unintended" outcomes of "ideal" educational practices which are ignored or underemphasized as identified in the critique of Hirst in chapter two, above.

The basis for many of Martin's criticisms of analytic educational theory is her identification of what she calls the "Epistemological Fallacy" upon which much of the analysis is based. This fallacy, which Martin details in her critique of Hirst's theory of liberal education, "... consists in arguing from a theory of knowledge to conclusions about the full range of what ought or ought not to be taught or studied."[35] She further asserts that value judgements will always play a role, implicitly or explicitly, in decisions about what to teach and what not to teach and any view of a knowledge based curriculum had best recognize this in order to accommodate, account for, and deal with these values.

Specifically, she denies the assumption made by Hirst that noncognitive states are dependent on cognitive states, and even if they were, cognitive educational objectifies are not logically basic.[36] Assuming that they are, and concentrating on the development of the individual rational mind -- in our society especially -- produces "ivory tower people," who one assumes may rationalize well, but are hampered in their ability to evaluate and act in the real world of human and social relations.[37] The need for an understanding of social and political concerns, as well as the nature of knowledge, in formulating a philosophy of education is indicated by Martin in her description of the consequences of instituting a program of liberal education such as Hirst suggests,

> ... a liberally educated person will be a lopsided person: a thinker but not a doer, a experiencer but not a maker, a feeler but not a moral agent. And consequently a world populated

> by liberally educated people had better be perfect to begin with for the individuals in it will not act to make it better, even if it occurs to them to do so, they will not know how.[38]

From this critique Martin adumbrates some of the characteristics of "a new paradigm" for liberal education as the development of persons. It would, in its make-up, be "gender-sensitive"[39] rather than seeing gender-linked differences as a shibboleth for different and unequal treatment of boys and girls/men and women as she cites Rousseau and his followers as doing in prescribing markedly different content for the education of each sex.[40] Neither is it realistic to make a claim of a "gender-free" ideal as these claims have tended to mask and subordinate the concerns and qualities considered feminine by taking the stereotypical male ideal as the universalized ideal archetype.[41] In general, Martin calls for the ideal of liberal education and the liberally education person to include not only training in the narrow concerns of the productive processes, identified by Hirst as the "forms of knowledge," but to include education in those areas traditionally considered peripheral to liberal education and mainly part of the female sphere of reproduction or child-rearing.[42]

More specifically, the sorts of areas she details as being necessary to the development of a well educated or fully developed person include an understanding of the relationship between thought and action including initiation into not only the "forms of knowledge," but into various artistic, linguistic, and mechanical skills as well. She notes, "... there would also be room for feelings, emotions, and attitudes to flourish, for creativity and imagination to develop, for making and doing and moral commitment."[43] Because we can no longer be any more complacent about these latter areas, from the reproductive sphere, being "picked-up" in the normal course of life than the "forms of knowledge" which Hirst identifies, if we feel they ought to be part of the development of an individual, then they should be part of a liberal education, and the epistemological fallacy should not blinker our choice by denying the necessarily normative nature of curricular decisions.[44]

Neither should it blind us to the ties these decisions have with social and political policy and theory.[45]

Martin then goes further in specifically addressing the question of education for autonomy and its implications for a "new paradigm" of education and the question of "other-directedness."[46] An issue such as this may be key in developing a critical understanding of the possible relationship between teachers qua professionals and teachers qua pedagogues. Rather than try to discuss it here I will attempt to explore it in some depth in the next chapter.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have attempted to outline alternative conceptions of the relationship between the individual and our society. Such an understanding is necessary for the development of a practical, effective, and moral stance as a professional teacher. In evaluating conceptions of this function, it is important to understand how they deal with the concept of "alienation," since this can be the locus for a dialectical analysis of the relationship between individuals and their society. It is also, therefore, the locus for many moral and ethical concerns, since an individual's dealings with others are often cast in terms of these concerns, and alienation is seen to manifest itself in amoral, immoral, and unethical activity.

Christopher Lasch has been particularly successful in this respect, with his theory of the development of the narcissistic form of consciousness in response to a society predicated on the imperatives of mass production and mass consumption.

As well, the development of feminist perspectives as a social movement and in various disciplines has been based, in a large measure, upon the historically produced and institutionally sanctioned alienation of women. In questioning their own alienation and their alienated status as women, feminists explore not only the reified manifestations of that alienation; they study the underlying processes which produce those manifestations as well.

In doing so alternate conceptions of the synthesis of humans with their environment are produced. So Carol Gilligan arrives at an alternative and more inclusive understanding of human moral thought in psychological terms. Mary O'Brien develops a reasonable basis for society based on the dialectics of reproduction which explains the social alienation and domination of women by men in terms of men's alienation during the biological process of reproduction. And Jane Roland Martin, using concepts derived directly from Gilligan and largely complementary with O'Brien, demonstrates the marginalizing narrowness of commonly accepted educational theory.

What is striking about each of these studies of alienation in contemporary society, aside from their mutual use of dialectical/historical methods, is that they start at different source points of alienation to arrive at very similar descriptions of the modern human condition. Where Lasch and feminists studied here differ is not in their views of society and alienation's effects upon it and the individuals of which it is comprised. They differ in the nature of the types of alienation they studied. While Lasch focuses on aberrant behavior and the accompanying psychological states becoming the norm in a disintegrating social order; the feminists studied the effects of a whole range of behaviors, values, and cognitive states -- which were considered "normal" by females -- being alienated by being marginalized by the male powers-that-be in directing the formation of dominant intellectual, moral, and social orders. What is, again striking, is the similarity in their conclusions about the effects of these two apparently separate sources of alienation. As well, both key on the failure of the regeneration or reproduction of moral values as one of the dynamics of alienation and social disintegration. Lasch acknowledges the contribution of feminist thought to his theories, though he derides, as does Susan Parsons, those parts of the feminist movement which ignore or neglect the fact that alienation is a synthetic product which must be mediated by other social objects or products.[47] In other words, a mystical or direct union with the natural environment or source of life is neither effectual, possible, nor desirable.

A notion of social order -- or more significantly, the synthesis of relationship between the social order and the individual consciousness -- is important. It is important because this relationship determines how people understand and hold values as individuals and as a society. And further, how that society -- with those values, more or less -- is reproduced or regenerated as a moral order. The role of education and educators in this process is obviously vital since as a social function education is to serve at least partially as an agent or reproduction.

Which aspects of the social order need to be reproduced by education is often, as Jane Roland Martin indicates, open to question. Some of these questions, about the aims of education and educators, as professionals and as pedagogues with their own peculiar methods for achieving these ends based upon a critical understanding of social and ethical issues will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter Three: Footnotes

1. Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (London, 1970), p. 81.

2. Regeneration, here and subsequently, should be considered as a synthetic process and not simply ensuring that social structures and objects, including values, are "cloned" intact as whole from one generation to the next. It does however, include the notion of a stable transition or adoption of these structures and objects in a,more or less, peaceful or "natural" process.

3. Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism (New York, 1978).

4. Christopher Lasch, The Minimal Self (New York, 1984).

5. Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts" in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan (Oxford, 1977), pp. 77-87 passim.

6. See Robert Hunt, "Introduction" in Personalities and Cultures, ed. Robert Hunt (Austin, 1979), p. xii.

7. Ibid.

8. Although Marx's Materialist Conception of History and Human "species being" are obviously convivial to this approach.

9. Lasch, Minimal Self, p. 16.

10. Lasch, Culture of Narcissism, pp. 180-1.

11. This also brings to mind a quasi-syllogistic question:

> If knowledge is power, and information equals knowledge; then, does absolute information corrup absolutely?

12. Lasch, Culture of Narcissism, pp. 74-5.

13. See Ibid., pp. 7-13 passim, where the "therapeutic sensibility" is defined on p. 7 as the desire for, "... the feeling, the momentary illusion, of personal well-being, health, and psychic security."

14. Lasch, Minimal Self, pp. 90-0.

15. Lasch, Culture of Narcissism, p. 230.

16. Lasch, Minimal Self, p. 255.

17. See Jane Roland Martin, "Excluding Women from the Educational Realm," Harvard Educational Review vol. 52, no. 2 (May 1982), pp. 133-148, and Harvey Siegel, "Genderized Cognitive Perspective and the Redefinition of Philosophy of Education," Philosophy of Education 1983, ed. Robert E. Roemer (Normal, 1984), pp. 35-51.

18. Susan Parsons, "Feminism and the Logic of Morality: A Consideration of Alternatives," Radical Philosophy 47, (Autumn 1987), pp. 1-11.

19. Parsons, "Feminism and the Logic of Morality," p. 6.

20. Carol Gilligan, "New Maps of Development: New Visions of Education," Philosophy of Education 1982, ed. Donna H. Kerr (Normal, 1983), p. 58.

21. Ibid., p. 59.

22. Ibid., p. 58.

23. Ibid.

24. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, 1982), especially her references, throughout, to her longitudinal studies of moral development. Gilligan provides an index of the participants on p. 181.

25. Mary O'Brien, The Politics of Reproduction (London, 1983).

26. O'Brien, Politics, p. 26.

27. Ibid., p. 39. Note: The implications of this are, in effect, much like Lasch's shift from the study of the effects of production, per se, to the study of the effects of consumption.

28. Ibid., p. 54.

29. Ibid., p. 26.

30. Jane Roland Martin, "The Ideal of the Educated Person," Educational Theory vol. 31, no. 2 (Spring 1981), p. 105.

31. Ibid., p. 102.

32. Ibid., pp. 105-6.

33. Ibid., p. 106.

34. Ibid., p. 108.

35. Jane Roland Martin, "Needed: A New Paradigm for Liberal Education," Philosophy and Education: Eightieth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education ed. Jonas F. Soltis (Chicago, 1981), p. 47.

36. Ibid., p. 50.

37. Ibid., p. 44.

38. Ibid., p. 53. Note the similarity to Lasch's narcissistic type of consciousness.

39. Martin, "Educated Person," p. 109.

40. See Jane Roland Martin, "Sophie and Emile: A Case Study in Sex Bias in the History of Educational Thought," Harvard Educational Review vol. 51, no. 3 (August 1981), pp. 357-372.

41. Martin, "Educated Person," p. 109.
42. Ibid.
43. Martin, "New Paradigm," p. 54.
44. Ibid., p. 55.
45. Ibid., p. 50.
46. Ibidl, p. 55-6.
47. Parsons, "Feminism and the Logic of Morality," passim.
48. Lasch, Minimal Self, pp. 240-253, passim.

CHAPTER FOUR

A NORMATIVE SYNTHESIS OF PROFESSION AND PEDAGOGY.

Having come to an understanding of the status of the occupation of teaching as a profession in chapter one; reviewed some of the common critiques of teaching as a profession and as an activity in chapter two; and examined some of the important social aspects of moral concerns in the third chapter; it is now perhaps appropriate to present a specific synthesis which might elucidate the meaning of the role of the "professional teacher," especially as it manifests the responsibilities and duties of moral agency.

That teachers have a moral responsibility toward their students is, I believe, an uncontroversial and true statement given most conceptions of teaching as an educational activity. Some, such as Langford, Wilson, or Ozga and Lawn would also suggest that teachers -- especially, but not necessarily only, as professionals -- have obligations, duties, and responsibilities to other groups and interests as well. Langford sees the duties of professional teachers rising out of their contract for services with their immediate employer. It is very much a legal/economic duty imposed and dictated by the terms of contract.[1] Wilson, in his essay on the professional aspects of teaching, and Ozga and Lawn, in Teachers, Professionalism, and Class, see teachers as having duties with regard to values produced in and of the class structure of their society -- though they take potentially conflicting positions regarding how those duties are to be fulfilled. Both also recognize a responsibility of the teacher qua professional toward the profession. In Wilson's case this is because the profession should serve as the receptacle for educational standards by which professionals are given legitimacy.[2] For Ozga and Lawn it is the collective nature of the profession as a workers' organization in a situation of class conflict which gives it value for individual teachers.[3] These are obviously not the only areas where teachers are seen to be accountable.

One problem, then, in deciding the parameters of the role of professional teachers as moral agents is to select and balance the areas in which duties, responsibilities, and obligations are exercised, especially when they come into conflict with each other. At this point a rather lengthy and complex analysis could be entered into which would delineate the various claims on the professional teacher by students, parents, employing agencies per se and qua agencies of the collective or selective will, by colleagues, and by the subjects of the curriculum qua "forms of knowledge" or qua "cultural heritage." But it seems likely that such a philosophical analysis would yield little in the way of substantive normative suggestions for teachers as it would be so wide-ranging and complex in its ramifications and conditions, and be too reductionist and abstract in its approach to have any practical value or use. These are precisely the problems noted in chapter two with many approaches to treatments of issues in teaching and professionalism.

Instead, in this chapter, I will attempt to propose a synthesis which demonstrates the possible form which moral agency for teachers could and ought to take. This synthesis will primarily take the form of an exploration of how teachers might treat the phenomenon identified in the last chapter as the focal point, if not the origin and source, of much amoral, immoral, and unethical behavior, that is -- alienation.

It must be noted here, that a radical assumption is being made: teaching and education are not sui generis activities, and they cannot be pursued successfully in isolation. Therefore the prescriptions made hereafter will also seem radical, if not Utopian, in their aspect. They are not, however, ill-considered and they do develop out of an understanding which sees social and moral concerns having a necessarily integrated nature. Consequently the role of the teacher as educator must reflect these integrated concerns as education, by its nature also has social and moral concerns.

Rather than outline in detail the specific moral obligations and consequent rights teachers have with regard to the various individuals, groups, and interests with which they have direct and indirect dealings, a broad view of the teacher's moral task will be

described. This broad view and its central moral imperative -- the importance of dealing with a synthetic approach to alienation -- will, it is hoped, become clear. The relationship of this issue with other concerns, such as teacher authority and the development of autonomy, will also be developed. The broad view of moral concern for teachers is based in the assumption, expressed in chapter three above, that the process of education is a process which is primarily reproductive in nature. There are many senses in which this might be seen to be true.

The first sense is rather uncontroversial as it is simply the recognition that when a teacher is involved in a process of education she is trying to bring about an understanding and appreciation of some select cultural achievements or perceptions, usually in a more-or-less intellectual, rational way. Thus the cultural and intellectual heritage is reproduced from one generation to the next. In this, weaker, sense the reproductive aspect of education is seen in a very specialized and limited way -- as the reproduction of intellect -- and it emphasizes the explicit intellectual content of the curriculum in educational institutions.

A second sense of education as reproduction has a much broader notion of what education should be and what it does, in fact, reproduce. In this stronger sense the reproductive aspect of education are seen to extend not only to the specific content of the explicit curriculum but to the effect of the form the content takes. It also holds that the reproductive nature of education does and should extend beyond mere intellectual development. This essentially the view which Jane Martin explicitly develops in "The Ideal of the Educated Person."[4]

In these two senses we have the main ground which has been staked-out philosophically. One could say, as Jane Martin implies, that the "stronger" sense includes and modifies the "weaker" sense. There are also other, less explicitly philosophical, views of education as reproduction. One of these sees education's institutional arrangements as the means for (re)producing a work-force for monopoly or other capital formations, with, for example, "computer literacy" among one of the "marketable skills" which are taught.

Another view sees the imperative of education being the inculcation of religion or religiously derived values in the manner of a spiritual photocopier; any perceived variation in the expressed values is reason enough to denounce the "secular humanism" of public education, decry the moral and spiritual break-down of society, and set-up a "religious" school. Obviously there are many variations on these themes.

Which notion or combination of notions is most appropriate for the reproduction of morally acceptable or even morally superior individuals and their society? Such a task would be much too large and difficult for any one group or interest to achieve, unless it is near to omnipotent. Any such concentration of power might vitiate any such goal, no matter how noble. Given this factor, it has been maintained that the role of teachers and of education is very finely and narrowly defined and ought to be tightly constrained by epistemological, moral, or institutional restrictions. It would seem, therefore, that consideration of the teacher's goals and methods must be viewed in the context of those of a larger social complex. But this appraisal and any consequent practice must be critically proactive if they are to be any more than simply bureaucratically effective or socially functional. Neither of these latter two characteristics carries any inherently great moral weight, whereas teaching as a morally reproductive activity must.

It was maintained in chapter three above -- according to Lasch and Gilligan -- that the development of moral sensibilities may also be seen as the avoidance or amelioration of alienation. This development depends upon the growing ability to perceive and establish an effective coherence which manifests itself in a system of values. This growing ability, in turn, depends upon the conscious and reciprocal abilities to objectify and subjectify and to subsequently mediate between the results of these two mental acts. It follows from this that the teacher's task is to foster the growth and development, in her students, of these abilities. In other words, it is the teacher's task to foster those abilities and facilities in students which lead to their psychological integrity and their social integration.

In order to shed light on how professional teachers, given structural and other limitations, might promote these processes in more specific terms, once again the work of Christopher Lasch and certain feminist thinkers will be examined, in terms of their suggestions, prognoses, and prescriptions for dealing with alienation. Based on the adumbration of these positions certain specific pedagogic and critical social practices will be outlined for a morally proactive teaching profession.

Christopher Lasch - The Insights of Irony

If, as Lasch makes clear, the roots of alienation are fixed in materialist soil, then the foundations of "integration" -- here used to identify the process which may be seen as contrary to alienation -- are necessarily to be found there too, if they are to be found any where. However, it must be remembered that the problems of alienation are, for Lasch, posed in dialectical terms. Their resolution cannot be determined solely in terms of social prescription; there must be some indication that existing forms of human consciousness are amenable to integration and not set in some irredeemably pathological condition. In other words, while one cannot make a silk purse from a sow's ear, one may have to untangle many cocoons in order to get the materials to start working.

For Lasch, these basic materials -- these cocoons -- are present in modern society. He sees as evidence of this the desire of individuals to take responsibility for their lives, even though the areas where they may do this are continually undermined, distorted, and contracted by modern institutions. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the typical psychological manifestation of this interaction is in the form of ironic detachment which results in political and social apathy. Though this reaction is an alienated one, it demonstrates to Lasch evidence of the desire to maintain and experience a "love of the world ... of human associations and human works, which give solidity and continuity to our lives."[5] The ironic detachment and apathy are the alienated result of the confusion and feelings of helplessness which are produced when most individuals attempt to have

meaningful and effective interactions in the social, political, and economic areas of society. These attempts are largely frustrated as human efforts are channelled through agencies in the form of massive bureaucratic and industrial infrastructures, and subsequently given a distorted or disproportionate reflection in the media of mass communication.

The sense of ironic detachment is developed, in part at least, as a reaction when overt ideals such as caring, autonomy, self-direction, substantive notions of freedom and equality are materially contradicted or denied by the interactions the individual has with the infrastructures which are, nominally and explicitly, supposed to promote or aid the individual fulfill the ideal. The dissonance thus experienced leads to a distancing and desire to withdraw or refusal to involve the self in such experiences by way of denying the validity of the principles, ideals, or values and/or the ability of the individual to attain or affect them in any meaningful public forum. As areas of competency are subverted or appropriated, so are the possibilities for exercising responsibility and personal power and the sense of marginality and effective alienation of the individual grows as the area where one can meaningfully control one's life seems to shrink so other, "public," areas are rejected by the individual.

There are several ways in which this residual and minimalist attempt at autonomy and coherence can become more integrated and less marginalized and thus less alienated and alienating. Political and social change are obviously important in Lasch's view[6] for promoting a sense of autonomy, or "selfhood" as he labels the notion of individual empowerment. This notion is itself interesting because it contains the basis, in turn for a notion of an integrated social and moral order.

Important in creating a sense of selfhood is the notion of authority which is both rational and social in its genesis. It is social in-as-much-as in order to be effective it must not take on the aspect of dominance, for once there is a long-term inequity in power relationships the inevitability of alienation is assured. But its validity comes from the lived experiences of the society, and while tradition is not to be reified, neither is it to be

neglected, it is to be respected as one of the ways members of a coherent society seek integration through identifying with their common traditions. It is a way of sharing values.

Authority is rational in-as-much-as its manifestations have demonstrable reasons for existing and the practical process of re-evaluating those reasons is not only a way of becoming human but is also a uniquely human process, especially when it can take the form of a public discourse, or some other social act. Lasch takes pains to emphasize that the techniques of what he calls "instrumental reason," which he sees as a reductionist raising of means over ends, are not an adequate substitute for "purposefulness," which he sees -- in turn -- as one mark of an integrated individual.[7]

Integrated individuality is the agency whereby the self and society formulate a paradoxical balance. In order to function most properly as a singularity the self must be an effective part of the social order. The human manifestion of self must be, to a large degree, social manifestations -- intelligible and largely acceptable to the society or some significant, though perhaps not a large, portion of its members. Compementary to this proposition is the notion that a society must produce some degree of integration in its individual members if it is not to collapse or become unrecognizable as a coherent society through the machinations or apathy of alienated individuals. This obviously puts the individual and society each in a potentially paradoxical situation with regard to their mutual homeostasis.

The important "mechanism" for maintaining this paradoxical balance is the development of a critical conscience. Lasch makes clear what he means by this, then contrasts it with a more conservative view of the function and functioning of conscience:

> (conservative thought equates) ... conscience not with an awareness of the dialectical relationships between freedom and capacity for destruction but with adherence to a received body of authoritative moral law. It hankers for restoration of punitive sanctions against disobedience, above all for the restoration of fear. It forgets that conscience originates not so much in the "fear of God" as in the urge to make amends. Conscience arises not so much from the dread of reprisals by those we have injured or wish to injure as in the capacity for mourning and remorse.[8]

There are several important things to note about this notion of conscience; first of all it connects the functioning of individual freedom with the notion of personal responsibility. This sense of responsibility is not ultimately based upon personal fear of consequences for the self, but upon a reasoned concern about the effects of one's actions (or inaction) upon others. Authority is neither externally arbitrary, nor concerned with what Lasch identifies as a liberal "therapeutic" approach which is too concerned with eliminating the bad feelings a "guilty" conscience might provoke.[9]

Conscience here is seen as part of consciousness in as much as it serves as the intersection where moral awareness forms, as emotional sensitivity to self and others meets the rational or reasoning facility to make sense and calculate the worth of several possible outcomes. The development of conscience -- which seems to have atrophied to a lesser or greater extent, given the social apathy displayed by many modern individuals -- is part of the development of a sensitive and critical consciousness. But more, perhaps, than any other factor in the consciousness, conscience, depends upon the developed ability to distinguish self from other. And subsequently and consequently to be able to reasonably establish, maintain, and mediate the social connections between self and other.

In the last chapter there was an outline of how Lasch sees this process subverted in modern society. It would be unrealistic and ineffective simply to say that the elimination of the institutions and structures which produce these alienating effects is what needs to be done in order to produce personal and social integrity, though Lasch, as noted earlier, does not eschew such necessarily political steps in effecting change. But a simple, nostalgic, conservative, or atavistic longing for "the good old days" when individuals and society had "standards" in intellectual and moral pursuits is unrealistic and even destructive as it ignores the dialectical nature of the relationship between history and human consciousness.

Lasch's prescriptions for the development of integrated individuals and an integrated society are neither very specific; directed at a particular audience, such as

teachers; nor does he condense them into one set of principles. What follows is, therefore, inferred from his comments as they might apply to teaching.

In general, Lasch is quite critical of most formal forms of public education, and he is especially critical of post-secondary education. Historically he sees educational institutions, especially at the elementary and secondary levels as gradually attempting to usurp many of the socializing functions of families and undermining the competencies, responsibilities, and effectiveness of parents as part of the general move to the commodification of needs under monopoly capitalism. Lasch recognizes and asserts the explicit socializing functions which formal public schooling has had since its inception in the nineteenth century.[10] The problems attendant on this function of schooling and teachers have been subsequently exacerbated by the gradual expansion of school's sphere of influence (if not its power to actually influence) at the expense of parents and families and the abandonment of legitimate academic standards for a "therapeutic" approach and the expectation that schools could carry the bucket of social reform.[11] The rationale and justification for much of this, it should be noted, was based on the growing professional status of teachers and the momentum created by the growing bureaucracy of formal educational institutions as delineated in chapter one of this essay.

As institutions, schools and the profession of teaching should, in this view, untangle the bureaucratic structures which have developed to facilitate "mass" education -- as opposed to the education of individuals. It seems obvious in Lasch's analysis and that of others[12] that the imperatives of a large-scale, centralized bureaucracy may not always be consistent with any justifiably "educational" aims -- regardless of how those are delineated. Conservatives, liberals, and radicals can all agree on this point. However, the conservatives call for elitist education to save cultural standards. And liberals tend to fall prey to "lesser evilism" indicating that the present system may not be perfect, but in an imperfect world there are few practical alternatives possible -- aside from some minor tinkering, here or there. Radicals, of various hues, provide a range of suggested

alternatives to the present structure. Some may be similar in tone or content to conservative suggestions -- though with different aims and motives -- others may seem barely plausible. Many of these radical suggestions concern de-institutionalizing the process of education. In as much as the structural imperatives of present bureaucratic/professional institutions may detract from any educational aim which might be chosen, it is important to be clear about aims when specifying a de-institutionalizing argument regarding educational institutions.

In the present bureaucracies of school and profession, which are predicated primarily in hierarchical organizational structures, the positions of the students and their teachers are each isolated hierarchically and geographically in the classroom. They are isolated and marginalized both from the decision making reaches of the bureaucracy of education and from society in general. The instrumental rationality of monopoly capital which insists on a place for everything and everything in its place, relegates students and teachers to the bottom of the institutional hierarchy in the interests of "efficiency" and to ensure that the mandates of "mass" education as a social goal are carried out.

As practitioners of a mediated occupation (as defined in chapter one above) teachers are expected to adequately and efficiently fulfill their specific role in the larger bureaucracy. As some commentators have noted the mediation of the teacher's position as a professional is made plain in North America, and most other western societies, in a multitude of ways but most tellingly in the distribution of power regarding curricular decisions.[13] However, the critical analysis of professionalism suggests, given the nature of the type of service provided by teachers, that the type of control which doctors and lawyers exercise in defining their terms of reference and relationship with their clients and client-groups may not be appropriate. Education is viewed as an evolutionary or developmental project. And though students are expected to spend a discrete period each day at school related activities; in most cases activities are expected to take-place and develop over the course of several years. Unlike lawyers or doctors -- who have generally chosen to provide services to their

clients on a project-by-project or case-by-case basis, which may involve one-on-one contact with the client for a few moments each year, albeit in situations of potentially acute need -- the teacher must develop a significant and sustained relationship with her students in order to most effectively ply the craft and provide them with a service.

The moral position which is derived from this form of practice is significantly different for the teacher. Where the doctor or lawyer may, in a clearly defined situation, attempt to look after the medical or legal interests of his or her client; the interests which the teacher is custodian to are more ambiguous. Obviously, lawyers and doctors have, historically, had a great deal to do with defining their own areas of practice and authority, to a much larger extent than teachers have, and I do not mean to suggest that practice in these professions is not without ethical ambiguity and mediating influences, for better or worse. But to say that teachers must have the best interests of their students always at the forefront of their consciousness does not present us, in general, with as clear-cut an image of the teacher's moral imperatives. How, for instance, are those interests to be identified and defined? And who, in effect, is going to do that?

Unlike medicine or law where the profession has been entrusted and empowered with this responsibility -- teachers have been seen not only as servicing the educational needs of their students, but as also servicing the needs of their society as well. They are, in one perspective, civil servants. This leaves them, as the instruments of political policy, objects of political power, responsible to their political masters. In theory there may be nothing wrong with this arrangement, and it may offer some ethical advantages for society, writ large, over the type of power bases which medicine and law have established for themselves. The line between granting authority to an expert and granting authority to an elite is a fine one, lightly drawn, and perhaps easily erased.

In practice however, there is another perspective from which the occupation may be viewed. The dictates of political power which teachers are supposed to serve may be hostile, indifferent, or beneficial to the educational interests of the students which teachers

must also try serving. What further complicates the discerning of these issues is that the dictates of political power, may also change over time as governments change, or as the economic situation changes. Lasch traces what he sees as the erosion of institutes of education, subject to these sorts of forces in Chapter VI of The Culture of Narcissism.[14] Essentially, educational institutions have followed the dictates of monopoly capital in their historic formation and developed as bureaucracies, which includes the professionalized occupation of teaching. But, Johnson's and Larson's analysis of the older more "autonomous" professions as reviewed in chapter one above show that rather than confronting or countervailing the momentum of monopoly capital, they too have accommodated themselves to it, largely, perhaps, because of their historic symbiosis with its institutions. This is an important point to note for those who advocate more autonomy and authority for teachers as professionals on the model of these professions.[15]

Seen in this light the challenge for teachers -- as a professional occupational group concerned with the implications of their moral task -- is multifaceted. First they must establish that they have a social role which combines several different functions regarding the moral and reproductive task of reducing alienation experienced by, or likely to be experienced by, their students as individuals and, therefore, in the future of society. This recognizes the general commitment not only to the student, but to posterity as well.

Teachers must also seek to aid their students in establishing and successfully mediating the self/object distinction which is necessary for effective moral thought, valuing, behavior, and establishing social and personal meaning (see chapter three, above.) The specific pedagogic details of how this may be done will be discussed in a later section of this chapter, but stated broadly for now, the teacher does this by acting as a mediator between the expressed self of the student and the specific social forms with which the student comes into contact. The authority of the teacher in this essentially moral relationship is based on the care she must have regarding the student and posterity and the

expertise the teacher must develop and demonstrate in making effective representations of social experiences and phenomena to her students.

The teacher represents society to her students in a dual way. First cultural artifacts and intellectual manifestations -- forms of knowledge -- are made explicit and presented in the curriculum. Some proficiency in these subjects is instrumentally or intrinsically valuable and these values should be integrated and aid in the process of integration of the student. This is to say the content of these subjects should be known and possessed by the student as a developing adult member of the society at large. Such knowledge may be useful and become meaningful to the student as part of the shared values and traditions of the society.

Second, the teacher, with her authority, behaving as an adult member of society, acts as a model for her students. Lasch sees the need for authority in moral development as crucial, but indicates that this is the sort of authority which guides, rather than rules; as he develops the distinction it has important ramifications for the integration of the individual with the society.[16] The former sort of authority may fairly readily be justified by appeals to immediate moral rationality. The latter's justification is more dependent on naturalistic or existent socially determined power relations and models of human nature or human behavior which accept as their premise the inevitability of alienation. (This is not to deny that there is alienation and for the occasional necessary use of power by authorities directly on those they have authority for.) The point of the ideal form of authority, here, is to develop a responsible autonomy in the individual which is imbued with its own authority. The authority of the teacher in this case supplements the authority of the family with regard to the development of the child.

The implications of this view of the teacher's duties toward her students and posterity are many and complex. Teachers must have the autonomy to effectively exercise their authority, yet it must be remembered that authority, in part, stems from their function as representatives of society. And if that representation is to be fair, it is likely that there

should be a fair way for the individuals in society to select who represents society and how society is represented. In one direction -- the professional path of medicine and the law, for example -- expertise holds sway; in the other a more democratic approach is possible. Traditionally we have looked for bureaucratic institutions to mediate and solve this problem of competing claims -- "experts" versus "democrats." But it is hoped by now the problems of this approach should be obvious. Bureaucratic imperatives and inertia make claims which displace both the claims of "experts" and the "democratic" claims of society. Mass education is today a capital intensive project which requires hierarchies of centralized bureaucrats to administer its needs and resources. To use Illich's term, if not his entire disestablishing notion, educational institutions and the way they are administered must become more "convivial." That is, they must be more responsive to the needs of those who use them. Like Illich, Lasch emphasizes the importance of localism for giving meaningful coherence to the experiences of people through a developing sense of community. For Lasch justifications of "mass culture" which has eroded traditions and standards of localism, often turn on the pretext of widening material prosperity and increasing the democratic franchise. This is usually done because the notions of information, knowledge, and power are conflated, as was noted in chapter three above. The basic contradiction stems from the idea that the "more informed" people are, the "better informed" they are, and thus empowered to make wiser more democratic decisions. The idea of a "global village" in any true sense of the latter half of this term ignores the dominant influence of the technological infrastructures needed to mediate mass communication.[17]

Reducing the scale of the administration of educational institutions would imply for Lasch a framework of participatory democracy such as those outlined by Carol Pateman[18] or Patricia White[19] where the administration of most services would be localized in order to maximize the direct decision-making opportunities and abilities of individuals.

The "provincial" or insular nature of local control of educational institutions could be tempered by the influence of teachers and their association with one another in formal and informal collegial groups and organizations. On a formal level these groups would act in a cooperative way to ensure educational standards were defined and delivered on a local basis in an acceptable manner. This organization would act, in some ways, like a producers' cooperative, setting not only the "price" of the services offered, but standards and conditions for those who would offer such services as well. In other words, it would control entry to practice and professional discipline. But members would be expected to cooperate with local schooling organizations to ensure that children become educated. The sanction to teach would imply an acceptance of the responsibility to teach wherever needed on behalf of the association and its members. So, in theory, members might expect to be drafted to teach in remote localities or in areas which might not otherwise be desirable to live and work in. For economic reasons some sort of cost-sharing between the local community and the teachers' organization may be arrived at.

This sort of program implies a decapitalization of educational systems and even their integration with other social institutions in order to "cut costs." Children and their teachers may no longer be as segregated as they previously have been as the community's resources are used more frequently to help more directly in the education of its children. For reasons based in the psychological development of children, such integration may not be complete. Children should not be expected to participate fully in society without a chance to develop with some degree of security the skills, responsibility, and critical perspective needed to make sense of that society and their place in it. On the other hand, keeping them effectively segregated until some arbitrarily set date when they are suddenly expected to sink or swim, with little formally provided opportunity of first testing the waters is an alienating process in and of itself. By this former method the community and its members would also be made more directly responsible for the development of its

children. Again, I will deal more specifically with the pedagogic substance of such an educational system in a later section of this chapter.

It should be noted, finally, that Lasch places a great emphasis on the importance of the maintenance of worthy, rationally, and critically based educational and intellectual standards -- both because they are worthy, rational and critical and because they provide a sense of security and continuity which links any community or society with its past by way of its heritage. Such links are necessary both emotionally and intellectually if individuals, communities, and societies are not to be doomed to an incoherent, relativistic, alienated, alienating, ever, always, and only discontinuous sense of the present.[20]

Lasch has traced the cultural and psychological effects of "Total Institutions,"[21] undermining autonomy and creating an increasingly alienating society, while at the same time appearing to provide material abundance. To be effective at integrating, educational facilities must, themselves, stop or avoid being such institutions. Simultaneously, they must not retreat into becoming institutions for an economically privileged elite. Teachers must be wary that in upholding and advocating standards, they are not promoting, directly or indirectly, the interests and values of one sector of society at the expense of the interests and values of another. The most effective environment for this, as noted above, is one where democracy is of the participatory kind, that is, one in which political and economic power has been decentralized. As Patricia White notes, in such a society, the citizens must be possessed of faculties for both autonomy and a substantive sense of fraternity in order that it function effectively and its citizens become moral agents.[22] The institutions in society which promote integration along the lines suggested by Lasch, and citizenship as identified by White, including the institutions of education, though they may represent the authority of society and the curriculum, must not act with concentrations of power which promote the dominance of their sui generis institutional structure, or that of any class or sector which cannot be rationally and critically justified. Given the emphasis on

widespread decision making and the necessity for power to be substantially widespread in such a system, such situations are not likely to be common.

In such a decentralized system teachers will have more control over the difficult, but necessary task, of mediating the demands of their role as representatives of society with the demands of their role as advocates for the interest of their students.

A Feminist Prognosis - The Integration of Reproduction

The problem of alienation for most feminists, including the three dealt with in the previous chapter -- Gilligan, O'Brien, and Martin -- stems from manifestations of the historical dominance of males over females. Because of the dialectical nature of relations of production and reproduction, ameliorating this alienation -- synthesizing a society and a system of education which provide greater opportunities for integration -- is not simply a matter of giving females in the present society more opportunities to exercise various forms of power, control, and authority within the given social structure.

What is common in Gilligan, O'Brien, and Martin in each of their different areas of concern is the perception of a certain incompleteness in commonly accepted notions of what it is to be human in a humane society. Each of them looks rationally and critically at some specific aspect of this notion: Gilligan at the psychological aspects of moral development; Martin at what it means to be an educated person; and O'Brien at the relationship between ideas of human nature and the formation of human society.

In some ways the prescription for education for integration based on such feminist thought is similar to that of Lasch, and thus in many ways as, if not more, radical. Since alienation results from dominance, that is, the unjustifiable inequitable distribution and exercise of power, the obvious solution is to ensure that social relations, especially in their historic dimension, take place between equals or potential equals.

The role of historical time is important here because in some ideal, ahistorical, situation as inequitable distribution of power and resources can be justified on the grounds

that such a relation will result in a greater good for all than otherwise might be possible, due to economies or efficiencies of scale or to some entrepreneurial acumen. Indeed, such a premise could be said to be the basis for the notion of bureaucratic rationality and specialization. The problem with such a distribution is that in the dialectical process of history, once such a distribution is made, it is hard to unmake when the original function is fulfilled or even when it becomes counterproductive as the accumulation of power and resources mediates and reifies itself at the relative expense of any initial sense of other purpose. The most obvious example of this is the financial "reproduction" of monopoly capital, which produces no product other than more financial capital.

As Mary O'Brien indicates, the imperatives of such capital formation takes on a reproductive life of their own which denies other important dimensions of human life, especially the reproduction of human and other life on earth.[23] Given this historic factor O'Brien, like Lasch, sees the practice of politics in terms of dealing with power relations, as an important factor in mediating the integration of people and their society. Again in this dialectical concept of integration, individuals and society adjust to each other, rather than one trying to fit to the set of the other. For O'Brien, the personal is the political and in face of the ideologically created dichotomy between private realms and public it is necessary to establish a more critical and rational balance between the interests of reproduction and the interest of production. There should be a greater and more mutual integration of these spheres and "economic" concern should not hold such a singular public priority in either its macro- or micro- formations. In more prosaic terms this would lead to a greater sharing of tasks among those who produce and those who reproduce. And with a greater sharing of tasks would come a sharing of values and understanding.

In Gilligan's analysis of moral development she details the need to integrate two basic modes of moral thought and develop an articulation of the synthesis of this thought. Gilligan's insight, that the development of moral thought is intertwined with the development of a concept of self, is vital to developing critical understanding of moral

pedagogy. As with Lasch, who develops his notion from within a Freudian concept of human psychology, the ability to create a sense of meaning and value, and thus rational understanding is based upon the ability to distinguish self from other and simultaneously see the relationship between self and other.[24]

The notion of "self" of an "individual" and of the process of becoming autonomous is given prominence in Gilligan and O'Brien -- and in Martin, who sees it as the role of education to develop such autonomy.[25] However, each of these theorists sees individual autonomy as mediated by the necessary social concerns characteristic of human life and development. As O'Brien notes, the duality of the value of the individual "versus" the value of cohesive society should not be viewed as an "opposition," "intransigent," or "... as static dichotomies,"[26] but as dialectic theses which are necessarily subject to mediation which produces a number of synthetic products, including, at times, alienating social dysfunction and alienated "neurotic" behavior.

It is this pattern of thought which requires, in feminist theories of this type, not the abolition of conservative and liberal moral and political thought per se, and the values which they embody and/or promote, but the dialectical synthesis of this "malestream" thought with emerging articulations of "feminist" cognitive experience with the social and natural environment and the values generated from that. Gilligan calls not for replacing the ethic or paradigm of justice, but its synthesis with an ethic or paradigm of care, which has hitherto been less articulated in formal moral discussion. As far as individual moral development is concerned, moral maturity is not realized until the individual has mediated, or struck a balance between the intellectual and emotional -- individualistic and socializing -- influences of these two "ethics."[27]

In the arena of social, political, and economic concerns O'Brien uses the terminology of "production" and "reproduction" to characterize the collective efforts of humans. As with the historic "inarticulation" of one form of moral thought, reproduction as a material social act has been given short shrift in history or political economy. The need

to consider the social nature of reproductive processes, activities, and values becomes all the more critical in light of the overpowering nature of the productive sphere in the monopoly stage of capitalism. Thus reproductive activities per se (rather than in some "commodified" form where they are viewed or serve as some productive, consumptive, or otherwise economic function with its financial costs and benefits clearly measured and weighed in dollars and cents) must mediate and integrate with productive activities in an open, articulated, and public way:

> What will be abolished are the artificial, magical and symbolic barriers erected between production and reproduction, between women and men; barriers built and heretofore violently maintained in the interests of a ruling class and a ruling sex. This is only possible given the premise that the mediation of the dialectics of production and reproduction are subject to rational human control.[28]

This statement does not deny the value or importance of the productive or economic sphere, but, in terms of real human needs and existence, confronts it with another element in our material social experience which as, to our detriment as individuals and a society, been undervalued in our critical considerations of well-being.

It is Jane Martin who focuses this pattern of argument on the conception of education. By emphasizing the contingencies of the narrow view of education as intellectual development for the concept of the educated person, Martin introduces a critical note into the discussion of curricular content. She indicates how such an emphasis on intellectual processes is primarily "productive" in the nature of its content and its effects, and thus alienates those in our society primarily concerned with reproduction from its process and subsequently alienates those who are the products of such an education from the reproductive world.[29] Further, Martin identifies the singular attempt to produce autonomous individuals as an ideal of these "liberal" forms of education as both a failure and a mistake.[30] While such theories of education have usually taken for granted that such reproductive forms of thought as caring and the sensitivity to others, which must

accompany their emphasis on the intellect, would be "picked-up" in the home; Martin indicates that such assumptions are no longer true, if indeed they ever were.[31] Education, if it is to be effective as a social and a moral force must account for intellectual and emotional development. She emphasizes, as do Patricia White,[32] Gilligan, and O'Brien that autonomy per se is not a sufficient condition for individual and social development.

Again in calling for change in our notion of what education is and what it does Martin does not call for scrapping entirely the attempted education of the intellect. In calling for a new "paradigm" of education she says it must be a paradigm,

> ... that does not ignore the forms of knowledge (as outlined by Hirst), but reveals their proper place in the general scheme of things as but one part of a person's education; one that integrates thought and action, reason and emotion, education and life; one that does not divorce persons from their social and natural contexts; one that embraces individual autonomy as but one of many values.[33]

In Martin's broad outline of education, attention would not be paid only to the development of the mind as a rational instrument, but to the development of states of mind which will motivate rational moral action and to the human skills to be able to act as well. From the perspective of non-dialectic "common sense," though the human ability to be rationally self-conscious may seem to be sufficient to distinguish us from other beings,[34] it is not sufficient to form a moral, integrated human person or society. Though, again, few would disagree that such a self-conscious autonomous rationality is necessary for the development of such people and such a society.

Why then should education as a purposeful activity restrict itself primarily to intellectual development, especially in the face of evidence from history, psychology, sociology, and other disciplines that the affective development of children is often frustrated, abused, or neglected by other institutional arrangements and conditions in our society? One response to this question follows the arguments of Lasch who sees educational institutions and the arrangements made for them as undermining the

competencies, responsibilities, and thus moral authority of individual relationships, such as the family and community might otherwise form, which have traditionally been seen as the infrastructures which foster affective development.

However, an implication of the dialectics of integration which stresses the articulation and promotion of reproductive social activities and values within society, is that rather than having such activities hived-off to a specialized institution (usually in the form of a bureaucracy) they are integrated with the productive activities which in our specialized, "interdependent" society have come to dominate our way of thinking and organizing such activities. Thus there must be an equitable interpenetration of productive and reproductive activities and their attendant responsibilities. For example, workers would be encouraged to bring their families to work, industries would be expected to host -- on some sort of regular basis -- children from their communities. This of course will wreck havoc with traditional concepts of economic efficiency as individuals will not only be responsible for providing some service or producing some good, but will also have to help look after children in a general way or teach them something specific. Naturally most workplaces will have to be made convivial enough for children and if a workplace cannot be made that convivial then questions must be raised as to whether any human should exist in that environment.

Rather than "rationalize" the production of human values to a specific set of institutions, modeled on the techno-bureaucratic forms of monopoly capital, or relegating it to a genderized underclass, this function should be generalized to a greater degree in the community. This does not deny the role of family arrangements in bringing-up children and inculcating moral affect; it could, indeed, reinforce such arrangements as their true value to society is realized. Notice, though, that this does not mean that those concerned with education should <u>not</u> be concerned with those activities which are identified as reproductive concerns because the family is thought to be "looking after that."

Our present socio/economic arrangements may be characterized as specialized/inter-dependence where the mutuality of the relationship of dependence may itself be a function not only of one's area of productive specialization, as it does for example in professionalized occupations, but on the access to resources one can establish. What the feminist theory discussed here implies is a generalized/interdependence where social reproduction becomes, to a greater extent, everyone's concern and therefore the interest in allocating resources to these tasks becomes both more acute and more chronic.

Interacting with children will no longer only be a task for a specialized few in a narrowly defined institutional arrangement, but this does not mean that teachers as an occupational group will cease to exist. Their role, as advocates for the interests of their students, would perhaps grow as they sought to coordinate the activities of their students in the community. They might also serve to ensure that standards with regard to some degree of uniformity or commonality of education and substantive educational opportunity were set and met. This concern for standards is a function of education, as mentioned before; one part of the political and national socialization of the population, which has historically justified public expenditure and control of the educational process. However, with the integration of reproductive values into the social order in a more primary role, which would present a mediation in the sort of political institutions which developed, again along the lines which White suggests,[35] of a participatory democracy where practically all children must be socialized and educated for the direct manipulation and use of political power.

As well, teachers would have a role in the more traditional mode of passing on the "forms of knowledge" which are often not directly assailable by her students given the limitations of community resources; human, economic, geographical, etc. And though these subjects would by no means be considered as of secondary importance in the curriculum established with the guidance of the local teachers, they would not predominate "school time" as much as liberal educators might presently wish. As Peters points out, there is in moral behavior a certain amount of learning through assimilation in social

situations and the development of habitual moral behavior is of some importance.[36] But little emphasis is placed on these elements of moral development, by Peters or other philosophers of the analytic school, perhaps because these elements are considered by them to be developmental and not subject to the rational exchange deemed appropriate for educational activities. Yet, beyond the content of the intellectual substance, little consideration seems to have been given to the sort of behaviors and habits which might be engendered by the institutional arrangements of formal education. By integrating educational activities into the other productive and reproductive activities of the community and society, students would be able to experience and participate in character-building situations which are typical of their society while being recognized as still undergoing an individual developmental process. Parallel with this moral development, which might be characterized by a growth in responsibility and appreciation of individual relationships with others, is a growth in autonomy, characterized by individual ability to critically exercise rights and create some measure of personal authority or capability. The social environment must be such that the activities conducive to the development and learning of these abilities, skills, and habits are encouraged. As these feminist critics have pointed out, often society frustrates such developments and learning, at least for a large portion of the population.

Profession and Pedagogy

The previous two sections of this chapter have given some indications of the shape and direction teaching as a profession ought to take if teachers are to pursue the development of moral autonomy in their students and a social environment where such people might live effective lives. What is important about Lasch and the feminist thinkers discussed here is the emphasis they place on political concerns for the moral development of the individual. This is because they have an understanding of the relationship between alienation and the ability of individuals to think and act morally. This has some importance for moral pedagogy because understanding the psychology and phenomenology of

alienation and integration for the individual is necessary for such practice, and will be dealt with presently. But it also has some consequences for the organization and representation of teachers as some sort of autonomous moral/social force.

First, the organization itself should minimize in its structure and practice the potential for generating alienation. What this means is that teachers would have to mediate or produce some organizational form or structure which would not only perform the integrative function of giving them identity and an adequate level of empowerment as teachers; it would also have to support the efforts of individual teachers and not unduly deny the interests of other parties with some stake in education. Indeed, it might act as an instigator in helping various groups realize their interest in, and contributions to, the diverse projects of education.

In the first chapter, above, the structure of the profession of teaching was seen to be different in its historical genesis and present form from other professionalized forms of occupation, such as medicine or accounting. Often professions, in order to legitimate and justify their particular practice and monopoly of practice, make claims of expertise and of certain ethical standards. In as much as these claims serve to reify the specialized and differentiated practices of professionals, they also serve to keep in place the alienating relations of power, which vary from one profession to the next and are not always, on balance, in a given profession's favour. As a mediated profession, the practice of teaching is isolated and marginalized by its relegation to a place at the bottom of a bureaucratic hierarchy. It should be pointed out that teachers share a great deal in the status of their students, for better or worse. Empowerment for teachers does not mean they should seek to emulate the structures of professions which are seen to have more autonomy in their practice, such as medicine or law. The perceived autonomy in these professions is gained at the expense of their clients or those that are likely to become their clients. Such a scenario is unsuitable for teachers because: their clients, the students, do not have much

autonomy to begin with; and, one of the teacher's moral tasks is to engender, develop, and teach more autonomy in, with, and to her students.

Empowerment for teachers, then, must mean something other than what it means for professions which claim expertise and a monopoly of practice. It could logically mean being able to claim resources and methods to fulfill the task of education. The problem of how this task is defined still remains. Certainly doctors and lawyers exercise great influence in defining the tasks set for their professions. Should similar power and influence be sought by teachers? This would mean reducing the claims to power and influence which have been exercised in the name of society by the institutions of government. The direct influence of parents and students on the system of education has been much attenuated through the creation of huge bureaucracies of schooling. Indeed the rights of parents in the education of their children are often, now, questioned: a position which is maintained often by taking an unacceptably narrow and "productive" stance in defining what education is, and an overly generous view of what such an education can do for people.

From the analysis presented above, the course for teachers to follow is to call for the deinstitutionalization of the capital intensive government controlled bureaucracies of education. In their place teachers, acting co-operatively, could coordinate the implementation and control of programs on a local level where teachers and the community, including especially the families involved in educating their members, would participate. Teachers would, of course, still instruct, but they would play a much greater role in coordinating their students' instruction, using the resources of their community. For example, a mathematician or engineer employed locally might provide instruction for the "math" class; the local newspaper might supply instruction on exposition; and the local clinic could give lessons in first aid and care of infants.

The training of teachers for such a system of education would likely have to change. Though they would have to have a critical understanding and some mastery of the

"forms of knowledge" or some other similar "liberal" curriculum, such knowledge is not in-and-of-itself sufficient for the development of the skills and sensitivities teachers would need for working with each other and their communities for the good of their students. Undoubtedly, in this, as in other forms of education in such a society, the concepts of initiation, apprenticeship, and interning will play an important role. Professional organizations will see active and effective participation in the occupation as the important criterion of competence, and formal membership will be based more on this than certification through some bureaucratic program.

The mediated nature of the occupation would not be likely to change, though the form of that mediation would be more direct and less based on bureaucratic authority. The direct involvement of the community in both arranging for, and actually participating in, the education of its young people[37] should help to ensure their social integration and that of their teachers. Teaching as an occupation will be mediated inasmuch as teachers will have to interact and consult with the community in creating and carrying out the curriculum. Their expertise in education, their experience, and membership in a cooperative, proactive, "professional organization: would be tempered by the needs and desires of the informed and active communities in which they worked.

Teachers' concerns with their students and their students' welfare leads to a logical and contingent concern with posterity. These types of concerns should lead teachers as individuals and as a profession to become (pro)active in pursuing solutions to these concerns in arenas other than that which have hitherto been delimited as "schools" or "education." This might include areas such as "peace," "ecology," and "economic security." Certainly care should be taken to ensure that such activities do not detract from the pursuit of more immediately educational concerns such as those which directly involve the students under their charge. But there is little point in pursuing these "educational" concerns if there is no degree of assurance that students will be able to realize any benefits

from their education in the future. This sort of activity by teachers can, of course, act as a model for moral behavior.

The disestablishment and reorganization of formal educational institutions will have some impact on the practice of pedagogy. Teachers, who now usually spend only nine to twelve months with an age discrete group of children, or only teach one subject to several groups of children, have little opportunity to develop the responsibility of helping to guide the development and education of any given group of children. This militates against either the children or the teaching gaining a significant identification with each other in any but the most exceptional cases. What might be more effective, from the point of view of gaining integration and a responsive/responsible sense of moral autonomy is to have "classes" which are age heteronomous where the children are expected to care for each other -- usually on the pattern of the older helping the younger -- where the teacher has responsibility for the individuals in her class over some lengthy course of their education. The teacher could then supervise the progress of individuals and guide them, exchanging students for certain lessons with other classes, and ensuring that the older students did help the younger (and vice versa) as required, to develop their social sense of responsibility and affiliation in an effective manner.

Following Iris Murdoch's suggestion, there might be greater emphasis on the aesthetic appreciation of various forms of art and nature.[38] Aside from engendering states of mind appropriate to moral behavior and the ability to regard those states of mind in self and others through the processes of creating, and the appreciation of, art, the cultural aspects of such study can focus the students' attention beyond the immediate concerns of their present day community and show them their links with more universal concerns. All of this subjective and social experience does not deny the need for a firm grasp of the principles and techniques of moral reasoning, rather they ensure the provision of a context in which such techniques will be meaningful and be seen as applicable by the students. On

this point Peter's specific criticism of Murdoch's approach to moral concerns may be germane:

> ... there is Iris Murdoch's ... critique of Kantian and Utilitarian systems. Her system starts off in Humean fashion by making the appreciation of virtue central, the just and loving assessment by the spectator of the individual. She then rather takes off into Platonic realms. Much that is usually ascribed to the use of reason is swept up into the love of the good. But there is practically no mention of the more public and political area of moral life.[39]

While Murdoch identifies the importance of understanding "states of mind" for successful teaching in the area of moral education, her understanding of the relationship of the individual to the broader social and cultural sphere seems flawed, as Peters indicates. She sees the cultural artifacts and activities as fixed in their meanings and significance and these meanings and significances are objectified and the process of understanding them is something the readers/viewers/listeners "discover" rather than a process to which they might bring their own experiences and form meanings of their own, which nonetheless share a common locus in the work of art.[40] Murdoch's concept is non-dialectic and ahistorical and fails to show an appreciation, as Peters notes, of the relationship between social life and the conditions which affect it and the private, subjective life of individuals in producing an awareness and appreciation of moral concerns and moral values.

Peters, as has been indicated, can be faulted for identifying "reason" too singularly with "... the public and political area of moral life," especially as far as pedagogy is concerned, and in his own way presenting a non-dialectic and ahistoric depiction of moral thought and concern, which is so denatured it may be fruitless to expect moral behavior to result from just "educating" people in this fashion.

A balance must be struck, then, in pursuing the education of individuals, which recognizes the reproductive nature of such an activity; which sees it as more than a simple linear process of selection and conditioning for life in the job market/all consuming economy and society of monopoly capital; while simultaneously not denying that

socialization is an important process in moral and other significant forms of autonomy. This is why an approach to education, and the moral aspects of education in particular, is necessary which sees the role of education in minimizing and eliminating alienation in the dialectical relationship between the individual and society, since this is the source of much non-moral thought and behavior. Expressed in a more positive manner: teachers should seek to provide for the affective, intellectual, and social integration of their students; realizing their task in the developmental processes of their students and in the ongoing historical processes of their culture and society.

The role of the "profession" in teaching should be to foster cooperation among teachers and between teachers and others to develop methods, procedures, and structures which will promote this goal. It must however deal with the alienating effect that widespread and large scale bureaucracies have had, and seek to promote teachers' own aims and functions in a manner which is convivial to, and consistent with, those aims and functions -- which, of course, are the integration of individuals and of society. Similarly, structures which depend on the privilege of a reified social/economic/political elite as creators, custodians, and purveyors of "culture" and value are likely to contain their own internal contradictions and thus produce alienation as well, and must also be rejected as possible forms of moral order.

Summary and Conclusions

What I have attempted to demonstrate in this essay, and more particularly, in this final chapter, is the relationship between certain aspects of individual moral development and education and the dynamics of social function as they have significance for the professional teacher. This has consequently involved some complex considerations of the teacher's task as a moral agent. The notion of professionalism enters here because the profession, which is ordinarily expected to guard teachers' status, economic welfare, standards of "expertise," also is to set teachers' ethical standards. But not much has been

said, directly, in this essay about these "Codes of Ethics" or "Standards of Professional Conduct," essentially because they are products of the project or process of professionalization which I have dealt with at some length. As such, these codes exist because they are seen to be one of the characteristics, traits, or functions of that form of social organization, and not because they rise from any conditions or essences peculiar or necessary to the practice of teaching.

A limited view of teaching as an intentional activity predicated upon rational exchanges also obscures the essence of educational activity and its participants as fully human. This has many consequences for teachers since they are on the frontline -- at the bottom of the schooling hierarchy -- delivering or attempting to deliver services to their students and thus sharing and experiencing much of their students' alienation, while they often, inevitably, help to generate and reinforce much of that same alienation.

I have referred often to alienation and two related theories, Lasch's and that of certain feminists, which attempt to explain how alienation and its manifestations come to exist in such an apparently prosperous society. The interest expressed here in alienation stems from the power and facility such dialectical theories of alienation have for explaining the psychological and social genesis of non-moral behavior. By doing so they present clues which would allow us to minimize and ameliorate many of the social and psychological conditions which serve to generate such behavior.

The teacher's primary, though not discretely singular, task was moral agent is to promote the continual creation of moral agency and the conditions of moral agency. At the individual, phenomenological, level this means teachers must have the ability to present and reinforce conditions which foster the development, in their students, of the ability to mediate, in an integrative way, the distinctions and relationships between self and other upon which systematic, valid, shared, and critically coherent values may be founded. Both Lasch and Gilligan note and emphasize the relationship between personal development of the "self" and moral development.

Perhaps because this process involves the various processes of development, rather than simply a learning process -- that is, something which is intentionally rational and directly engages the intellect -- some philosophers would say, that it should not be part of the teacher's major concern in education. Teachers, to avoid the charge that they might participate in indoctrination, or mere "babysitting" -- this view holds -- should mainly be concerned with activities which may have logically intended results, when done well. This would be fine, as Jane Martin points out, if these logical intentions, when singularly carried out, did not have so many unintended, or contingent results.

Just as with intellectual and physical development, certain environmental conditions must be fostered for the affective and even aesthetic development of individuals in order for moral growth and behavior to take place. Further, such conditions are not outside the purview of the teacher or of education.

But such an expanded view of education in the area of moral concern has implications for the way we deal with and understand these matters as a society. And, further, it has specific implications for the way the role of the teacher is carried out and thus for our concept of what the profession is. This is a somewhat inverted view of the relationship between "ethics" and professionalism than that which was alluded to previously in this section, in dealing with the, so called, "codes of ethics." In short, instead of adopting "appropriate" ethics because it wishes to have a professional form, the occupation should look at the necessary ethical concerns of teachers and of education and adopt a professional form which is most convivial to those concerns.

About the precise institutional form such an ethically aware profession might take I have been deliberately vague. It is difficult to predict or hypothesize about because of the great number of factors, both theoretical and actual, which must be taken into account. In recommending the disestablishment of present forms because of their inherent propensity to marginalize and alienate, it is important to also suggest at least a possible general form of something with which they may be replaced, if not the specifics of the transformation.

Following O'Brien's thesis about the need to integrate and bring about a synthesis of the productive and reproductive spheres of human thought and activity; it is interesting to note how schools, teachers, and education are singularly located to do such a task. Indeed, it is common to characterize one of the implicit aims of the present systems to act as a method of passage from the necessarily reproductive environment of the family to the necessarily productive environment of the "working world." The inadequacy of this view of education and its attendant functions should be obvious, as should the unmediated dichotomy which underlies it. Lasch traces the difficulties which such a product of instrumental reasoning has for modern workers/consumers/citizens despite the massive material wealth the employment of such a view might provide -- in the short-term, at any rate.

Educators must look for some way to bring about an integration of these "public" and private" realms for their students as one function in an integrating society with integrated individuals. The roles which teachers take in their community must broaden as they seek to serve the educational interests of their students by helping to coordinate their learning activities in the larger world and, as teachers, also serve as advocates of their students' interests in posterity.

It is most likely that some form of participatory democracy, with an emphasis on widespread local control over decision making would be the most convivial political form for this type of organization for education. And reciprocally such a democracy would depend upon an educational system of a similar form in order to help create citizens who would and could participate in such a society.

The notion of autonomy (or self-direction)[41] is important in these considerations because the concept of moral maturity depends upon the idea that individuals are free and capable of making and carrying out moral decisions. Certainly the notion of Person A telling Person B what the "right thing" is and then forcing or coercing B to do it would not indicate any significant moral achievement on B's part (and perhaps not on A's, either).

Yet, as Martin maintains, the promotion of a curriculum which singularly emphasizes rational forms of knowledge and the development of the intellect may do so at the risk of leaving the student without the skills and functions to be effective as a moral person. This is supported by Lasch and Gilligan, who emphasize (especially in the former's case) that those skills -- depending as they do on the development of a sense of "self" in a secure environment -- are, in fact, undermined by the atomizing effects of modern social/plication/economic forms -- including school and ites emphasis in curriculum.

Paradoxically, perhaps, this sense of self, and thus autonomy or self-direction, can most effectively be nurtured and developed by seeing, not just that individuals are connected to one another and the institutions they or their social predecessors have created in history -- but discovering how these are connected to the self, and how these connections may be realized in the social world by the individual. This is one of the functions of what O'Brien and Martin characterize as the "reproductive sphere" and it has been neglected, overlooked, and rejected in the attempt to make education and considerations of education a sui generis, "intentional," and rational activity -- often to justify its status as an area of specialized or professional concern.

This is not to say that those activities which are characterized as being intentional and rational are not necessary to the creation of moral autonomy, and the pedagogy of moral autonomy -- they are. It is just that they are not sufficient enough to deserve so much attention from teachers and other educators. If, as teachers, we are to attempt to develop conditions to bring about morally conscious and conscientiously moral individuals, then it is incumbent upon us to understand the entire nature of the educational process as an intellectual, affective, and social enterprise; to use all the elements at our disposal to ensure our students have, at least, a good chance to exercise their morality, in the present and in their future.

Chapter Four: Footnotes

1. Glenn Langford, Teaching as a Profession (Manchester, 1978), p.7.

2. John Wilson, "The Teaching Profession: a case of self-mutilation" in Journal of Philosophy of Education, vol. 20, no. 2, 1986, pp. 245-250 passim.

3. J. T. Ozga and M. A. Lawn, Teachers, Professionalism, and Class (London, 1981), pp. 145-148 passim.

4. Jane Roland Martin, "The Ideal of the Educated Person," Educational Theory vol. 31, no. 2 (Spring 1981), p. 105. See also the discussion in chapter three of this thesis.

5. Christopher Lasch, The Minimal Self (New York, 1984), p. 93.

6. Ibid., p. 253.

7. Ibid., p. 255.

8. Ibid., p. 259.

9. Ibid., pp. 205-223 passim. Note also the stipulative use of "therapeutic" as in note 13, in chapter three.

10. Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism (New York, 1978), pp. 132-133.

11. Ibid., pp. 125-153 passim.

12. See, for example, Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital (New York, 1974); Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society (New York, 1970); Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism (Berkeley, 1977); and Terence J. Johnson, Professions and Power (London, 1972).

13. Bruce A. Kimball, "The Problem of Teachers' Authority in Light of the Structural Analysis of Professions," Educational Theory vol. 38, no. 1 (Winter 1988), pp. 1-9 passim.

14. Lasch, Culture of Narcissism, pp. 124-153.

15. Such as, Kimball, "The Problem ...," or Graham Haydon, "Autonomy as an Aim of Education and the Autonomy of Teachers," Journal of Philosophy of Education, vol. 17, no. 2, 1983, or even Wilson, "The Teaching Profession ..."

16. Lasch, Culture of Narcissism, pp. 181-183.

17. Lasch, Minimal Self, pp. 39-44 passim.

18. See Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge, 1970).

19. See Patricia White, Beyond Domination (London, 1983).

20. Lasch, Culture of Narcissim, pp. 5-7.

21. Lasch, Minimal Self, p. 70.

22. White, Beyond Domination, p. 72.

23. Mary O'Brien, The Politics of Reproduction (London, 1983), p. 200.

24. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, 1982), p. 94.

25. Jane Roland Martin, "Needed; A New Paradigm for Liberal Education," Philosophy and Education: Eightieth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, ed. Jonas F. Soltis (Chicago, 1981), p. 55.

26. O'Brien, Politics, p. 187.

27. Gilligan, Voice, pp. 164-165.

28. O'Brien, Politics, p. 193.

29. Martin, "Educated Person," pp. 105-106.

30. Martin, "New Paradigm," p. 56.

31. Ibid., p. 55.

32. See, White, Beyond Domination, p. 72. Though, doubtless, many feminists would disagree with White's choice of the term "fraternity" to describe the equality in individuals which enables them to understand and sympathize with the interests of others in their society. It is also interesting to note Martin's comments on the political forms of democracy and their relation to the educational development of people in "New Paradigm," pp. 51-53, which are similar to White's conclusions.

33. Martin, "New Paradigm," p. 58, parenthesis mine.

34. Richard S. Peters, Reason and Compassion (London, 1973), p. 122.

35. White, Beyond Domination, pp. 4-5, where she explains how a society based on the principles of participatory democracy is a society which recognizes at least some of the principles of feminism.

36. Peters, Reason and Compassion, p. 33.

37. This does not preclude other age groups sharing in the process of education, it simply recognizes that young people are those who are seen as requiring education by virtue of their need for socialization, initiation, or experience.

38. Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (London, 1970), pp. 84-90 passim.

39. Peters, Reason and Compassion, p. 21.

40. Murdoch, Sovereignty, pp. 88-89.

41. See, Haydon, "Autonomy as an Aim," p. 220, where he distinguishes between "autonomy" as a mental act of freedom and "self-direction" as the ability to freely act on one's autonomous thoughts.

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